Manuela Naldini teaches Sociology of the Family in the University of Turin's Faculty of Political Sciences. Her research focuses on comparative welfare state and gender inequalities; work-family reconciliation issues; childcare policies, parental policies and women’s employment. She is currently heading a research group on "Labour Market Flexibilisation and Work-Family Reconciliation Issues" in the EU Network of Excellence EQUALSOC which is coordinated by Robert Erikson. She is also involved in a local study on vulnerability and social policy and in a national research programme on living as a couple in a flexible economy which is funded by the Italian Ministry of Universities and Research. 

Compared to other European countries, the number of children per woman is extremely low in Italy and the number of people older than 75 extremely high. Is demographic change an important topic for the Italian public? 

It has been an important topic since the end of the 1990s. In fact, the government took some (irrelevant) measures to increase the number of children. This included the "baby bonus" that parents received when their second child was born. The payment was first introduced in 2004 and subsequently changed every year in connection with budgetary amendments: it was in force for two years, then suspended for a year, and then re-introduced for another year in 2006. The last baby bonus was granted for the first child as well. The measure no longer exists. 

Was the baby bonus given to all mothers living in Italy, including immigrants and single parents? 

The baby bonus was limited to people of Italian origin who possessed Italian citizenship. At least you did not have to be married to qualify for it. 

Nowadays, what do Italians think about demographic change? 

There's a lot of rhetoric about "having to increase our population" and "having to do something for the families". Nevertheless, a lot of the blame is being put on the women. Phrases such as "they don't want children", "they want their own lives", or "they want to hold down jobs" are not unusual. In any event, there is a general consensus in favour of assisting people who start families. People think that having one child is a good thing, as is having a second one. But that only applies if you have a secure job, as you need a solid income to ensure the youngsters' welfare. The problem is that many people in Italy don't get a decent job until they are well over 30. This in turn makes it very difficult for couples to have a second child. 

Together with your colleague Prof. Dr. Teresa Jurado Guerrero, you developed a theory about the "southern European model" for families and the welfare state, as found in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. What are its main features? 

There are three aspects: a low fertility rate, solidarity between generations, and a strong caring role for women in these countries – due to the absence of public and private social services for children and the elderly. 

Which factors shaped this "southern European model"? 

Firstly, there were authoritarian regimes in these countries before they evolved into democracies. These regimes ran strong pro-natalistic programmes, as well as measures to obstruct the employment of women and to sustain and foster gender inequality. As a result, from the 1950s until the 1970s, there was strong opposition to family intervention and especially towards family policy in Italy. The same happened in Spain after Franco’s death and the end of fascist rule. 

Secondly, in southern European countries, the church has always had a powerful influence on family issues such as marriage, as it has on social life in general. The latter point is illustrated by the socialisation of children and the education of the very young. Beyond this, the church itself has traditionally run some social services. In Italy, for example, child care services were largely provided by the church into the 1960s. And in Spain, many schools for very young children are still run by monks. 

Thirdly, these countries have fairly similar economic structures, characterised by late industrialisation and the failure of industry to dominate other sectors of the economy (Italy is an exception in this respect). Spain, Portugal and Greece evolved directly from economies based largely on agricultural produce to ones that were heavily reliant on the third sector. This is important because it created a structural shortage of employment opportunities. Even male breadwinners encountered severe problems in their efforts to get jobs. This shortage was then used to argue that "women should not work". It was in response to these structural difficulties that some of the distinctive features of southern European economies developed. Until the 1970s, many families made their livings in agriculture, with both men and women doing the work – but not as employees. As a result, there was no clear division between paid and unpaid work – the women were working, but they weren't employed. 

Fourthly, there used to be agreement among these countries' politicians on what topics should be high on the political agenda. First and foremost, they felt a need to fight against the big corporations and defend those already in the labour market. However, they neglected their responsibility to ensure the well-being of the children. This stance is rooted in the Catholic notion of the family as a natural entity, one that has a moral obligation to provide the resources needed to raise its children. 

As a consequence, do family members depend on one another more than in other countries? 

Yes. In Italy, for example, children, parents and grandparents live together in the same household for much longer than in other countries. What is more, most people who don't inhabit the same building as their parents live very close by – frequently just a few minutes away. There is also a gender divide when it comes to responsibilities. Females – either family members or outsiders – are usually charged with managing the care of the children and the elderly. 

But the state's absence doesn't automatically produce a gendered structure of family care: the men could assume some responsibility for the caring. Italy had a powerful women's movement during the 1970s. Has this culminated in an alternative family model? 

In Italy, the women’s movement had no impact whatsoever on the division of labour within the family. It was important, because it triggered legislation on family issues, violence against women and abortion. But it didn't change the allocation of responsibilities within families. 

Assuming the only daughter leaves the village to work, gets married elsewhere, and therefore cannot care for her parents (or the parents have no daughter). Does something like this affect family structures and gender relations? 

There is another comparative study that was coordinated by Claude Martin from the University of Rennes and which covers seven European countries. The German section was directed by Chiara Saraceno from the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. The qualitative interviews we conducted for Italy revealed the following: if parents have one child only and that child is a boy, the likelihood that he will feel responsible for them and take care of them as an adult is significantly increased. For this reason, he will not leave all the work to his wife (his parents’ daughter in law), as has traditionally been the case. In this regard, demographic change has rendered some important changes in gender relations possible. But, it is still not on the political agenda at the present time. 

Interview by Margret Karsch, October 21, 2008 

The interview may be reprinted citing the source (Margret Karsch / Berlin-Institute).

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