by Margret Karsch and Iris Hoßmann

As the population of the Federal Republic of Germany declines, the average age of the Germans increases and more and more people with a migration background shape the street-scape. The perception that the structure of the population is significantly changing has long ago left the study rooms of the scientific research centres. The triad "less, older, colourful" has reached a broad public through the media. The evolution has its good and bad sides and both deserve attention. Even more: The demographic evolutions not only require — as do all social changes — ideas and concepts as to how best to deal with them, but also fast and at the same time farsighted actions, since the observations point out grievances and deficiencies which need to be resolved, as well as positives and potentials that should be exploited.

The findings are however very different on a regional level. "Less, older, colourful" applies indeed at federal level, but not in equal measure at federal state level or local level. Hoyerswerda for instance has lost one third of its population since reunification until 2006; Erding, near Munich, has in contrast increased its population in similar proportions. Women in the area of Fürstenfeldbrück lived seven years longer than in Palatine Pirmasens; men in the area of Starnberg lived eight years longer than in Demmin, Mecklenburg (Kröhnert, Medicus, Klingholz 2006). Different tasks arise here at regional level. The approaches on solving these tasks are therefore varied. The target to maximise living standards and satisfaction for all members of society can only be achieved with different specifications, not only because the needs of each citizen vary from another, but also because every region possesses its own history and develops individually, and cannot be lumped together in a Federal Republic manner. Nevertheless, the Federal Republic has to guarantee basic supply and care.

Thus, what is the triad "Less, older, colourful" based on, which is so often used to summarise the demographic change? Which demographic evolutions on regional level lie behind this triad and which political approaches could contribute to overcome the various associated difficulties and to capitalise on the opportunities?

Less Potential Parents, Less Children

Even until a few years ago the population figures of Germany was continuously growing. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, in 2003 about 82.4 million people lived in this country. But the number has since decreased, until 2008 to about 82 million people. The official predictions assume a further shrinking of population, which will eventually speed up due to the decreasing number of potential parents.

The model of the "medium" population threshold of the 12th coordinated population projection concludes that by the year 2050 approximately 12.6 million less people will live in Germany compared to the base year 2008.

This prediction is based on the assumption of an average 1.4 child per woman, a continuous increase in life expectancy as well as a yearly positive migration balance of 100,000 from 2014 onwards. The total fertility rate (TFR) per woman used for this calculation indicates how many children each woman would deliver throughout her life, if the fertility of women from all age groups remains as it was in the base year. In order for a population to remain the same — without immigration and migration and steady life expectancy — the TFR must be at the level of 2.13 (not only at exactly two children, as not all newborn reach the childbearing age).

If we first of all consider only the natural evolution of the population, therefore the birth and death rates, the population decline is due to the lower birth rates. In comparison to the 1960s and 1970s these rates are on a very low level: In 1960 about 1,261,600 children were born, in 2007 it was only about 684,900. This figure represents, indeed for the first time since 1997, a very slight increase of 12,000 births compared to the previous year, but should not be overrated. The present result of 651,000 births for 2009 stands once again below. A change in this trend is not to be expected as the number of potential mothers, i.e., women of childbearing age (the statistic of all 15-44 years old applies), does not reach the level of the 1960s and 1970s. This could be compensated by a higher number of children per woman — this rate however has been consistently low for the past 35 years.

The reason for the decline in births in the past was mainly due to a change in values — towards more individual freedom and self-determination, especially in sexuality. There has been previous periods of decreasing births rates, for instance at the end of the 19th century, when the infant mortality rate dropped and less births resulted therefore in the same number of children. Another factor is that through industrialisation, the differentiation between work in the public or private sector as well as the development of social security systems, children were reckoned to be of less economic value, as their role in contributing to the household and in securing pension was diminished. The two world wars and the great depression of 1930 also resulted in the fertility rate dropping.

The European-wide cultural change of the 1960s and 1970s has, on the other hand, contributed to a sudden drop in birth rates between 1964 and 1974.

Regional Differences

On a regional level however, differences remain existent, especially between rural areas and cities: The districts of Vechta and Cloppenburg register a continuous surplus of births. Be-tween 1989 and 1999 the birth rates actually increased. The reason for this increase is, besides traditionally high numbers of children on-site, the influx of ethnic German immigrants that disproportionately live in Niedersachsen in these two districts and had above-average numbers of children (Glander, Hoßmann 2009). In the district of Vechta the average fertility rate per woman was 1.57 in 2008, and in Cloppenburg 1.66. Demmin in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern even registered a rate of 1.70 and replaced Cloppenburg as the nationwide leader.

Until reunification the average fertility rate per woman was higher in East Germany than in West Germany. The change of system however had the fertility rate in the East drop and with 0.77 children per woman in 1994, it reached an all-time low in Germany. The fertility rate then increased again, while slowly dropping in the West. Considering the data of 2008 for the districts and urban cities of Germany, the separation of the country for decades is no longer visible with regard to the average fertility rate per woman: In many West German rural districts the fertility rate has adjusted to average or below average levels, whereas most East German rural districts have caught up. The fact that fertility rates are adjusting between cities and countryside as well as between East and West generally indicate that the improved education of women and their increased professional occupation are progressively changing the perception of family (Kröhnert, Hoßmann, Klingholz 2009).

However, the mothers in the West are often older than in the East. Births by teenage mothers for instance have increased in the East since reunification, with a level of about six per cent. In some economic problem areas of West Germany, this percentage is of similar level; in the average of the Federal Republic of Germany however, it represents only three per cent. The number of women becoming mothers between the age of 35 and 39 is in comparison much higher in the West than in the East. Major cities and wealthy regions with a high level of education of women are here on top — in Hamburg and Munich more than one-fifth of the new-borns have a mother who is older than 34 years. In Potsdam, Dresden, and Berlin this trend is also observable. In the Bavarian city of Starnberg, every third child is already delivered by a mother in her mid- to end thirties; in Frankfurt/Oder in contrast, only every eleventh child (Kröhnert, Hoßmann, Klingholz 2009).

The number of children does not always correspond to the number of children wished for by women and men, and childlessness is not always the result of an intentional decision (Sütterlin, Hoßmann 2007). Apart from medical reasons different factors of one’s personal situation play a role — as well as the basic social conditions, of which the importance of children is part of. Women who live in major cities remain more often childless than their female companions in rural areas. Childlessness is highest in the city states, particularly in Hamburg. In West Germany childlessness is even more frequent the higher the level of education of women. According to the micro census, which is the largest annual household survey, the quota of women aged between 40 to 44 (years of births 1964 to 1968) without children across Germany was 21 per cent in 2008, for the ones aged 50 to 54 (years of births 1954 to 1958) 16 per cent and for the age group of 60 to 64 (years of births 1944 to 1948) it was 12 per cent. In the former GDR, childlessness was rare; however, it increased starting from the birth year of 1960. For the birth year of 1965, the childlessness was around 25 per cent among the old federal territory and about 12 per cent in the new German federal states.

There is, however, almost no difference between East and West when it comes to the desire to have children. For women it is slightly higher in the East than in the West (1.78 against 1.73) and slightly lower for men (1.46 against 1.59).

Compared to other countries, the desire for children is rather small in Germany. However, according to the Population Policy Acceptance Study in 2003, 80 per cent of the interrogated aged between 20 and 38 wished to have children or already had children (Höhn, Avramov, Kotowka 2008). The fact that wish and reality in the desire to have children diverge from each other occurs however not only in Germany, but is a widespread phenomenon across the whole European Union. The quota of childless women aged between 25 and 39 who wish to have a child is especially high in Italy, Greece, and Croatia (Kröhnert, Hoßmann, Klingholz 2008).

Here lies the potential margin that politics could exploit if it seeks to support its citizens to start families. The compatibility of profession and family is therefore primordial, as higher equity of men and women and the economic pressure for women to participate in the labour market have become increasingly self-evident. The extension of day-nursery places is therefore not enough, especially not if the German Federal Government is conducting it with very little ambition and only aims to provide a place for one-third of the children by 2013. The fiscal system and pension scheme have to be accommodate and support the model of a modern family. This in turn implies that the challenges of gender equity are fulfilled and that discus-sions and debates about role models take place.

Less Immigrants, More People with Migration Background

The number of citizens of a country is not only determined by births and deaths, but also by foreign immigration — which is in decline. In the past there was more immigration than emigration, but since the first half of the 1990s the immigration growth has dropped. Since the 1970s the statistics of the Federal Institute for Demographic Research record a deficit of births compared to deaths and since 2003 this natural negative population balance is no longer compensated by migration influx.

About 6.7 million foreigners live in Germany. This equates to 8.2 per cent of the population. The quotas however fluctuate heavily depending on the federal state: The highest is reflected in Hamburg with 13.2 per cent, the lowest in Thüringen with 1.5 per cent. More important than the nationality is the cultural background of the members of the society and their respective migration experience for coexistence in a society. In 2008, 15.6 million people with migration background lived in Germany, which is about 19 per cent of the population.

These people however are not evenly spread throughout Germany, as shown by a study of the Berlin-Institute for population and research in 2009 — based on the data of the micro census 2005: Hamburg and Baden-Württemberg recorded one-fourth of the population, the highest portion of people, with migration background. In West Germany, Schleswig-Holstein recorded 12 per cent and is the region with the least percentage of people with migration background.

In the new federal states it is yet only 5 per cent — because of the marginal and very similar history of immigration. This analysis examines Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Sachsen, and Thüringen collectively (Woellert, Kröhnert, Sippel, Klingholz 2009).

The repartition is closely linked to different migration waves. With the exception of Berlin and Hamburg, emigrants constitute in all German federal states the largest proportion of people with migration background. In both city states it is people of Turkish origin. Emigrants and people of Turkish origin together represent in some federal states more than 40 per cent of all people with migration background — the former more frequently living in the countryside or in smaller cities than other groups of origin, the latter constitute the largest group of people with migration background in the majority of the cities. In post-war decades the Saarland attracted the most foreign workers, originating from Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece to work in the heavy industry. In Baden-Württemberg people with cultural roots in former Yugoslavia represent 10 per cent; in Bavaria 11 per cent of all people are with migration background. Emigrants from the Far East and their children very often live in Hamburg and in the new federal states — in both regions they constitute 10 per cent of all people with migration background. In Hamburg the overseas port is probably the determining factor and the former GDR had brought Vietnamese workers into the country — and many of them have stayed since.

Why does it actually make sense to regard people with migration background as groups — and who should be counted as a migrant and over how many generations until he or she is effectively a German? There is a public dispute over this matter. The figures of the OECD however prove without a doubt that at least in Germany much depends on the migration background and that the number of people with migration background is more significant than the sole amount of foreigners, as both groups have to combine elements of different cultures in their life. The social background is in Germany, more than in most other OECD states, still determining the course of education. The level of education determines the factors that strongly influence the integration in the society. A glance into the cultural backgrounds can thereby be helpful in taking measures to improve everybody's cohabitation. Furthermore, the integrating society has to inform itself more extensively on foreign qualifications and recognise them, as even highly qualified individuals stumble over this integration hurdle in Germany.

Besides foreign immigration the growing mobility of the Germans over the countries' borders influences the migration balance. The number of German emigrants in absolute figures has almost tripled compared to the figures of 1970. Emigration is furthermore a West German phenomenon and since the beginning of the 1990s especially young, single men are leaving the country. The number of highly qualified amongst them is greater than in the non-moving population. The consequence of this is: The already perceptible lack of skilled personnel will be further aggravated if Germany does not improve its immigration laws, facilitates and supports immigration as well as improve integration of people already living in Germany. After all, this "brain drain" can only be compensated by a corresponding "brain gain" and through support and further education of the local people.

Less Children + More Elderly People = Increased Average Age

The population has aged since over 100 years ago. The average age of the Germans is 43.2 years—in comparison, in India it is 24 years. The reasons for demographic ageing in the Federal Republic of Germany are to be found in the increased life expectancy, the ageing of the strong "baby boom generation", which was followed by a smaller generation of potential parents, as well as lower child numbers. In past years decreasing immigration has added to this trend — and since immigrants are often younger it has further increased the average age.

According to the Federal Institute for Demographic Research, in 2007 the life expectancy for newborn boys was 77.2 years, for newborn girls 82.4 years. The differences are not only bio-logically founded, but also depend on the life style. Smoking, alcohol consumption, and physical activity are strongly influential factors. Since the 1970s one can observe the differences between East and West Germany: In 1990 the life expectancy for women was 2.3 years higher in the West than in the East, for men it was 3.3 years higher in the West than in the East. However, the East has caught up: For women the difference is now only very marginal with 0.3 years and for men the difference has also shrunk — to 1.3 years. The reasons for this lie in the improved medical supplies and the better income levels after reunification. The gap for elderly and very old people between East and West has also decreased.

There are however also differences within East and West Germany, namely a North-South gradient in the West as well as in the East — girls born in 2008 in Baden-Württemberg can expect to become 83.3 years old. Boys can expect an age of 78.6 years. Girls have therefore a higher life expectancy of 12 months and even boys with 16 months compared to the countries’ average. The Saarland registered the lowest life expectancy for both genders, according to the mortality table of 2006/2008. Sachsen is the eastern front-runner in life expectancy for girls; for boys it is Berlin.

The growing number of very old people, which is in principle a pleasing thing, however also means an increase in chronic and psychological diseases, especially cases of dementia. The need for care increases with age: Between 70 and 80 years, only about 10 per cent are in need of care, after that the quota increases drastically — until 2030 there will be more than three million people in need of care if the age specific quotas stay consistent. The percentage increases therefore from today's 2.3 per cent to 4 per cent. In terms of care there are big differences between genders, also because women usually become older than men. In elderly years they live alone more often; men are in contrast taken care of by their spouses. About 60 per cent of the 90-year olds are in need of care, for women it is around 75 per cent and for men 40 per cent.

Few babies, many elderly

While the flock of kids will decrease in the foreseeable future due to low numbers of children and the disappearance of parental age groups, there will be a two-and-a-half fold increase in the number of very old people. By the year 2050 one person in eight living in Germany shall be over 80 years old.

From 2042 onwards the absolute number of over 74-year olds (very old people) will decrease. The percentage of very old people however continues to increase as the population shrinks — especially among the younger age groups.

The pyramid evolves into a mushroom

Today, the "baby boom" generation born in the 1960s constitutes the strongest age groups. Considering that with every generation since 1970 approximately one-third fewer children are raised compared to the number of existing parents, the population pyramid shown in the above figure transforms into a sort of mushroom — sharp tongues may say: into an urn (Köhncke 2009).

The present age structure reveals other defined cuts and decisive points: the few births after the First and Second World War and the victims of the war, the "baby boom", the falling birth rates in the years 1965 to 1975 (whereas the number of newborn infants only dropped under one million from 1972 onwards) and the few births in the new federal states. Since women have a higher life expectancy than men and more men lost their lives during the Second World War, the demographic ageing hits the women stronger than the men. According to the predictions, by the year 2050 the population pyramid will be almost upside down — and will demonstrate heavy list.

Therefore, the systems of pension and healthcare insurance have to prepare for higher costs with lower incomes. Reforms within the healthcare system have to take account the social ageing and the changing needs — especially in view of the rising number of dementia cases. In addition, there must be economic or other compensation for the unpaid work, which is at present mostly accomplished by women for the care of children and elderly — it also needs a structure that ensures that the need for closeness and communication does not have to give way under the economic pressure.

The Influential Factor of Internal Migration: Trends

The regional age structure however does not only depend on the number of newborn infants, mortality rate, life expectancy or foreign immigration, but also on internal migration. During the past few years different migration trends could be observed within Germany, of which three dominated: East-West migration, North-South migration, and suburbanisation of the cities towards urban environs. This trend has however weakened: In the meantime cities like Aachen or Mainz attract more people than their urban environs.

And something else has changed: In the years after reunification the old federal states recorded an increase in population, the new ones a deficit. The target area was especially the south of the country: From 1991 to 2008 Bavaria recorded a net influx of 653,000 people, Rheinland-Pfalz 220,000, and Baden-Württemberg 231,000. Between 1990 and 2008, 3.1 million people left East Germany (without Berlin); only 1.5 million headed in the opposite direction. Accordingly, 65.5 million people live at present in the old federal states, 13 million in the new ones (both without Berlin) and 3.6 million in Berlin. In the old federal states the population figures have increased until 2005; since 2006 West Germany is losing population. In the new federal states, the natural population evolution as well as the migration balance is negative.

In past years the migration from the East concentrated regionally on rural and economically underdeveloped areas. More women than men left, the majority from younger age groups with better educational degrees than the ones left behind. The prospect of a job and apprenticeship was particularly decisive for their departure. This evolution can be observed in many peripheral regions of Europe. The biggest shortage of women however is found in the new federal states — where there again the potential mothers are missing (Kröhnert, Klingholz 2007).

Civil Commitment as a Resource

In East Germany the demographic ageing is accelerated through migration, especially in the peripheral regions. The public budgets are very dependent on the age structure, in terms of revenues as well as expenses. The decrease of the employable population for instance and the change of employment patterns lead to lower tax incomes, especially in less populous areas. This has an impact on the provision of services, for example on the infrastructure in the transport or healthcare sectors. Rural districts, which are sparsely populated, have higher per capita expenditures to maintain the local infrastructure than densely populated districts, as streets, drainage systems or public transport generate costs even with low utilisation. Such regions are currently found in the new federal states; in the future, however, also in the old ones. And it is not foreseeable that a balanced ratio between old and young will evolve soon, as well as among the ones who receive social welfare services and the ones who raise them — as desirable as it would be.

As public funds cannot afford services it used to provide, the basic supplies are nowadays increasingly in danger. This also increases the importance of civil commitment. In ageing and shrinking regions voluntary services can support local supply structures: If no buses are circulating, neighbours form car pools in order to share costs and effort — for instance when they bring their kids for sports practice to the nearest city, for doctor’s appointments or to go shopping.

Political Tasks

The basic supplies however cannot depend on individuals. This would make them too fragile and would run the risk that not all citizens will be reached. At this point the local politics must take responsibility, as the basic supplies need to be ensured by the state. Since ageing and shrinkage are inevitable evolutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, it is essential that the politics absorb these evolutions and create sustainable strategies in order to adapt to the changes.

The tasks ahead, resulting from the demographic evolutions, cannot be solved exclusively through financial compensation. In order to combat not only the symptoms, for instance by reducing the structures or even by competing with other communities for residents, a radical change in approach is required which is oriented on the basic provision of services. This includes for example the guarantee of mobility and healthcare. This in turn requires regional planning strategies: The density must be improved in rural areas around middle-sized and small towns; it takes central places which provide education, healthcare, public transport, as well as an infrastructure for supplies and waste management (Weber, Klingholz 2009). In order to implement such an integrated approach, incentives for collaborations must be established — and in case of refusal to collaborate, sanctions must be considered.

Despite all accordance across the states, the population structure of the Federal Republic of Germany shows significant regional differences. The politics have to manage the balancing act between basic supplies and autonomous regional development, particularly in view of migration from rural areas. It can thereby reflect on a federalism that supports local action without losing the objective of general solidarity within a society. The diversity of living conditions does not necessarily endanger its equal value.

First steps would be more competences for the communities and reduced bureaucracy. This can strengthen an active citizen society, regional development and ultimately improve the quality of life — and therefore lead to a state where the opportunities of the demographic change are being exploited.

Literature / Links

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Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung (2007): Regionale Alterung in Deutschland. Demographische Trends und Entwicklungen in den Bundesländern im Zeitraum 1991 bis 2004. Wiesbaden.

Glander, Marie-Luise / Hoßmann, Iris (2009): Land mit Aussicht. Was sich von dem wirtschaftlichen und demographischen Erfolg des Oldenburger Münsterlandes lernen lässt. Ed. by Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung. Berlin.

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State: November 2010

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