Prof. Dr. Manuela Naldini, University of Turin
Interview by Margret Karsch, 21. Oktober 2008
Manuela Naldini teaches Sociology of the Family at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Turin. Her research focuses on comparative welfare state and gender inequalities; work-family reconciliation issues; childcare policies, parental policies and women’s employment. She is currently coordinating a research group on “Labour Market Flexibilisation and Work-Family Reconciliation Issues” in the EU Network of Excellence, EQUALSOC, coordinated by Robert Erikson. She is also involved in a national research programme funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research on living as a couple in a flexible economy, and in a local study on vulnerability and social policy.
In Italy, compared to other European countries, the number of children per woman is extremely low and the number of persons, who are older than 75 years, is extremely high. Is demographic change an important topic in the Italian public?
It has been an important topic since the end of the 1990s. In fact, the government took some (irrelevant) measures to increase the number of children, e.g. the “baby bonus”, which you received when your second child was born. In 2004, it was introduced for the first time. Subsequently, it was changed every year in connection with budgetary amendments. It was in force for two years, then it was suspended for one year, and then in 2006 it was re-introduced for another year. The last baby bonus was not only given for the second child, but also for the first one. The measure does not exist any more.
Was the baby bonus given to all mothers living in Italy, including immigrants and single parents?
The baby bonus was limited to Italians of origin, who possessed the Italian citizenship. Still, you did not have to be married to get it.
Nowadays, what do Italians think about demographic change?
There is a lot of rhetoric about “we have to increase our population”, or “we have to do something for the families”. Still, a lot of the blame is being put on the women. Phrases such as “they don´t want to get children”, “they want their own lives”, “they want employment”, are not unusual. In any event, the idea that starting a family should be supported prevails. People think it is good to have a child, also a second one, but only if you have a secure job, since you need an income to ensure the offspring’s well-being. The problem is that people in Italy often do not get a decent job until they are well beyond 30 years old. This in turn has a strong influence on the probability of having a second child, which becomes very difficult.
With your colleague Prof. Dr. Teresa Jurado Guerrero, you developed a theory for explaining a “Southern European Model” of the family and the welfare state in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. What are its main features?
There are three aspects: a small fertility rate, a strong solidarity between generations, and a strong caring activity of women in these countries, which is a result of the absence of public and private social services for children and the elderly.
Which are the causes of the specific shape of the “Southern European Model” of the family and the welfare state?
First, there were authoritarian regimes in these countries before they developed into democracies. These regimes took strong pro-natalistic measures, as well as measures against employment of women and measures to sustain and foster gender inequality. In Italy for example, from the 1950s until the 1970s, there was strong opposition to family intervention and especially towards family policy. The same happened in Spain after Franco’s death and the end of fascist rule.
Second, in Southern European countries, the church has always had a strong influence on family affairs, such as marriage, as well as on social life in general. Examples for the latter are the socialisation of children and the education of the very young. In addition to this, the church itself steered some social services, e.g. in Italy child care services were mainly organised by the church up to the 1960s, or in Spain, where still many schools for very young children are run by monks.
Third, these countries have developed a fairly similar economic structure, which can be characterised by late industrialisation and the absence a predominance of industry over other sectors of the economy (Italy is an exception in this regard). Spain, Portugal and Greece directly developed from economies mainly based on agricultural produce to economies heavily relying on the third sector. This is important, as it resulted in a structural shortage of employment. Even the male breadwinner was facing severe problems in getting a job. This shortage was then used as a justification to say “women should not work”. It was in response to these structural difficulties that some of the distinct features of Southern European economies developed: Up to the 1970s, many families made their living in agriculture, with both men and women working, but not as employees. A clear border between paid and unpaid work was thus absent – the women were working, but not in employment.
Fourth, there used to be agreement among politicians in these countries on what topics should be high on the political agenda. First of all, politicians felt that they had to fight against big enterprises and that they had to defend those who were already in the labour market. However, they neglected their responsibility to ensure the well-being of children. This stance is rooted in the Catholic notion of the family as a natural entity that has to supply the necessary resources for raising their children itself.
As a consequence, do family members depend on one another more than in other countries?
Yes, for example in Italy, children, parents and grandparents live together in the same household much longer than in other countries. What is more, most people, who do not live under the same roof as their parents, live very close to them, only some minutes away. Also in terms of responsibilities, there is a gender divide. It is predominantly the females (either a member of the family or a different woman), who organise and manage the care of the children and the elderly.
But the absence of the state does not necessarily lead to a gendered structure of family care, the men could assume a part of the caring. Italy saw a strong women´s movement in the 1970s. Has this resulted in an alternative family model?
In Italy, the women’s movement had no impact at all on the division of labour within the family. It was important, as it triggered law reform on family issues, violence against women and abortion, but it left no mark on labour division between men and women within the sphere of the family.
Assuming the only daughter leaves the village to work and gets married elsewhere, she could not take care of her parents (or there is no daughter at all). Does this leave family structures and gender relations unaffected?
In another comparative study, which includes seven European countries (Germany is included as well, the German case has been directed by Chiara Saraceno from the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung), and which was coordinated by Claude Martin from the University of Rennes, the qualitative interviews we conducted for Italy show that if parents have a single male child, the likelihood that later, as a man, this child will feel responsible for them and take care of them is significantly increased. He will thus not leave the entire work to his wife (his parents’ daughter in law), as it was traditionally the case. In this regard, demographic change has made possible some important changes in gender relations. Yet, it is not on the political agenda at the moment.
The interview may be reprinted with indication of source (Margret Karsch / Berlin-Institute).
