

Leading on Points

What Germany can learn
from Canada's immigration and
integration policy



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TWO COUNTRIES – TWO FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO IMMIGRATION

In terms of the number of immigrants living in each country, Germany and Canada both count among the top ten immigration destinations in the world.* With 11 million first-generation immigrants, Germany occupies third place behind the United States and Russia in global terms, while Canada with its 7 million immigrants comes fifth. However, since only half as many people live in Canada as in Germany, at 21 percent the share of the population born abroad is much higher than in Germany, where it is 13 percent.¹ Canada and Germany have arrived at these high immigration figures via very different routes, and even today there are still major differences in their immigration policies.


* Unless otherwise indicated, we use the word immigrant for all persons who were not born in their country of residence and did not possess their country of residence's nationality upon birth - irrespective of whether or not they want to settle permanently in their host country. This definition is not strictly in line with the Canadian definition, where immigrants are only those having permanent residence status in Canada.

As a traditional immigration country, Canada's history is marked by the settlement of formerly empty swathes of the country by European settlers. Whether they came to work in agriculture before the Second World War or in industry after it – immigrants were

expected to stay for good and help build Canada's economic power in the long term. In Germany, by contrast, both policy-makers and the public regarded the so-called guest workers who came to the country in the 1950s, 60s and 70s mainly as a temporary labour force.

Immigration magnets

Both Germany and Canada count among the top ten immigration countries worldwide. Relative to the total population, however, the number of immigrants in Canada is much higher than in Germany.



These different approaches to immigration have continued to have an impact right up to the present day. When Canadians talk about annual immigration figures, they usually cite the number of permanent residence permits granted. They think of immigration not as just moving one's place of residence to another country, but rather intending to stay permanently. In Germany, by contrast, the most important measure of migration is the annual difference between in- and out-migration (the migration balance).

New citizens needed

These differences are also reflected in the two countries' policies for granting citizenship. Immigrants to Canada can apply for citizenship after living there for only three years, whereas in Germany the minimum requirement is six years. And despite the liberalisation of the citizenship law in 2000, the idea that nationality is conferred by blood rather than by place of birth is still widespread in Germany. Children born in Canada are automatically Canadian citizens, even if their parents are foreigners. In Germany that is only possible if at least one parent has already lived in the country for eight years and is in possession of a permanent residence permit (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*).²

Historical differences should not, however, obscure the fact that it is possible to change track at any time. This is best illustrated by the new direction Canada's immigration policy took in the mid-1960s, when it abandoned the idea of „White Canada“, which was based on recruiting new citizens mainly from European countries. Since then the Canadian government's message to people from other nations has been: "It doesn't matter where you come from; what counts is where you want to go." This change was consolidated when the Trudeau government switched to a multicultural approach in 1971. From then on diversity not only became acceptable but also formed the very basis of Canada's immigration policy: immigrants were to become full members of society – "true Canadians" in other words – with Canadian passports and all the rights and obligations that went with citizenship, without having to relinquish the identity derived from their country of origin.

In Germany, too, the focus of immigration policy has changed in recent years. The government is increasingly trying to steer immigration to fit economic and demographic requirements and to attract highly qualified immigrants. Yet the laws regulating the migration of labour are still extremely opaque and in some cases highly restrictive. Although the ordinance on exceptions to the recruitment ban (bearing the unwieldy German name *Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung*) has in the meantime finally been abolished, new immigration channels such as that via the EU Blue Card, are only gradually being opened.

Unlike in Germany, immigration does not have ideological or political overtones in Canada and hence is not an issue on which elections are won or lost. A consensus exists in Canada that annual immigration of approximately 1 percent of the population is desirable, and its immigration model is

fundamentally designed to increase the country's human capital in the long term. Policy-makers are therefore seeking to bring immigrants to Canada who will integrate most easily in the long term owing to their qualifications and knowledge. Seeking to avoid short-term costs as far as possible, Canada obliges immigrants to furnish proof that they have sufficient financial resources to support themselves and their families for a time.

Both in Germany and in Canada the number of laws, regulations and edicts concerning migration policy have increased enormously in recent years. This illustrates the growing significance of immigration for these and other developed countries, but also the fact that the challenges policy-makers face are changing all the time, requiring a high degree of flexibility. Precisely because Canada has changed track so often, albeit without abandoning the general paradigm of a high rate of immigration and multiculturalism, it is an excellent model from which to learn. The flexible Canadian model, which exhibits a continuous learning curve, shows how, in designing a managed migration policy, mistakes can be avoided or rectified and obstacles overcome – as well as how immigration can be of maximum benefit to both parties.

Berlin and Stuttgart, January 2014

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THE KEY FACTS

Why we need immigration

- Low birth rates and rising life expectancy mean that German society is both shrinking and ageing. Even if there were an annual immigration surplus of 100,000 people, the population would still fall by about 12 million people by 2050. If Germany were able to gain 200,000 people a year, the decline would still amount to eight and a half million.
- Because the baby boomer cohorts will reach retirement age in the next two decades, the working population (defined in today's terms as those between the ages of 15 and 64) will be 15 million people smaller by 2050. Particularly young professionals and apprentices will become rarer.
- Even if it were possible to bring far more women and older people into the workforce and to provide more education for those with low qualifications and thus reduce unemployment, this would only slightly cushion the decline in the number of people in employment.

Why Germany needs to recruit more people from non-EU states

- The skilled workers required in Germany cannot in the long term be recruited internally or from other EU states. After all, many EU states will soon likewise be having to cope with demographic change, considerably reducing the number of potential young emigrants. What is more, immigrants from the EU tend not to stay permanently, with most of them returning home after a time.
- Structural change towards a knowledge economy has increased demand for highly qualified people. Compared with other immigration countries, Germany has so far not had much success in attracting the best brains.

Why Canada's immigration policy can serve as a model

- Through its long history as an immigration country Canada has gained a wealth of experience both with immigration and with integration policy. Every year it increases its population by about 1 percent through immigration, and most of those who come are economic migrants. Canada has continually revised its immigration policy to adapt to changing economic needs and is today regarded as a leading representative of human capital-oriented immigration. The goal of this policy is to select those immigrants who promise to be of greatest economic benefit to the country in the long term.

- One consequence of the Canadian recruitment practice is that immigrants on average have higher educational qualifications than the Canadian population. Although the number of immigrants with a university education has also risen in Germany in recent years, unlike in Canada a disproportionate number have no vocational qualification.

- While immigrants in Canada also have a harder time on the labour market than Canadians, the differences are much less than in Germany.

- Children in Canada manage to achieve educational upward mobility more often than their peers in Germany. Since immigrant children often surpass their parents' level of education, the integration gap between Canada and Germany becomes even wider in the second generation.

Which instruments have proven successful in recruiting workers to Canada

- Canada uses a points-based system to bring highly qualified people into the country, even if they do not yet have a job offer upon arrival. The immigrants are selected mainly on the basis of their skills and knowledge as well as their age. Language skills in particular have a significant impact on successful integration. Selecting people from particular occupations has generally tended to be counter-productive. Nevertheless, finding

itself inundated with applications, the Canadian government recently created a list of high demand occupations to administer access to the points system.

- Because Canada needs not only people with tertiary education but also workers with lower qualifications who are not reached by the points system, such as caregivers or skilled tradespersons, the country is opening up additional channels for immigration. Most of these initially grant immigrants who already have a job offer temporary residence. The door to permanent residence later on only remains open to some of them, however.
- For some years now, provinces with special labour needs have been able to select some of their immigrants independently of the government in Ottawa. In this way Canada has managed to distribute its immigrants more evenly across its huge territory.

How Canada integrates immigrants successfully

- Since many immigrants come to Canada without a concrete job offer, the state makes a great effort to smooth their way into employment. These efforts already begin in the immigrants' country of origin where they can attend courses to prepare them for life in Canada. Among the measures are the so-called Bridging Programs, which try to close

gaps in immigrants' theoretical and practical knowledge. Often employers are involved in the integration process for new arrivals – for example by making members of their staff available for mentoring programs.

- The children of immigrants to Canada benefit from the high average level of education of their parents. But they also encounter a generally permeable education system in which disadvantaged students or groups of students are given extra help. Immigrant children are also usually given extra language lessons to compensate for existing deficits.

What Germany should do

- Germany needs to increase its efforts to present itself to the outside world as an attractive country to which to immigrate. At the same time, politicians must show a greater commitment to immigration vis-à-vis the German population and emphasise its potential benefits, for the immigration of highly qualified people is precisely what will create more jobs.
- Germany needs to create steering instruments to target skilled immigrants. Here it could take a two-pronged approach: on the one hand, a human capital-oriented points system geared to closing long-term gaps in the labour market caused by demographic change that would immediately grant immigrants permanent residence (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*); on the other hand, an approach that takes account of the needs of the labour market and can react to

temporary shortages by allowing temporary residence, yet always with the prospect of staying in Germany permanently if immigrants manage to integrate successfully.

- To help immigrants find employment commensurate with their qualifications as quickly as possible, state and non-state actors must provide effective initial support. This should begin in the country of origin with information and orientation courses and continue once they get to Germany with qualification and mentoring programs.
- Immigrant children should be targeted for extra help from an early age to bring their language skills up to the level of native Germans as quickly as possible. Kindergartens and schools should try from the very beginning to involve parents in the education of their children. Since individual help for disadvantaged children and youth costs extra money, it is important to identify affected kindergartens and schools via social data and equip them with extra, specially qualified staff. Such programs would also serve to benefit native German children from socially weak backgrounds.

1

WHO WILL ACTUALLY BE DOING THE WORK IN THE FUTURE?

Over the past few decades Germany has been able to register steady, albeit slowing economic growth. The country has become more prosperous partly because the population of working age has continued to expand, providing businesses and other employers with a growing pool of labour. This trend is now coming to an end as more and more people reach retirement age and the number of young people reaching working age declines (see box). The dwindling labour force may in future become a factor restricting growth, partly because there could not be enough young people to fill available jobs and partly because the lack of a suitably qualified workforce could discourage investment.

Currently there is little to suggest that there is a general shortage of labour in Germany.³ But the first staffing shortages are already becoming evident in certain occupational groups and regions. The annual number of engineering graduates is still just sufficient to replace older engineers when they retire. But if demand for engineers were to rise as a result of an economic boom or structural change, this could no longer be covered.⁴ According to calculations made by Prognos AG, in 2030 Germany will have an overall labour shortfall of over five million including

2.2 million too few university graduates. The lack of highly qualified workers is also a result of the continuing shift towards a knowledge and service economy. The demand for workers with tertiary education is hence likely to go on rising disproportionately – and that in almost all fields of economic activity.⁵

Currently, small and medium-sized companies are experiencing particular difficulties finding suitable employees. This applies especially if they are located in peripheral regions and are hence less attractive for mobile workers from other parts of the country.⁶ Surveys of medium-sized companies have revealed that even today, 73 percent of them already have difficulty finding new sufficiently qualified employees. Fifteen percent have even experienced a considerable decline in turnover due to the shortage of labour.⁷

Alongside the question of whether companies will still find suitable employees in the future, the demographic change will also have a major effect on the financial sustainability of social security systems. Having fewer people of working age also means fewer potential contributors to welfare and pensions systems, and those who are still paying into the system will face a growing number of older people paying either very small contributions or none at all who need to be provided for. The pressure to adjust to this new situation is glaringly evident in the statutory pension insurance. Either contributions will have to rise in future or pension benefits will have to be considerably revised downwards. Current legislation provides for both these things to happen.⁸ All the more important then that the working population financing the social security systems with their contributions remains as large as possible.

The era of population growth is over

In 2002 around 82.5 million people were living in Germany – more than ever before. By the beginning of 2013 that figure had fallen to 80.5 million.* For the time being the population loss will continue to be moderate, but in the decades to come it is likely to accelerate considerably. By mid-century there may be around 12 million fewer people living in Germany than there are today.⁹

The negative population development has been driven by a sharp decline in the number of births. In the mid-1960s, 1.3 million children were still born every year in Germany, but by 2012 this figure had halved to around 670,000. In 1972, more people died than were born for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Every year since then there have been more deaths than births


Germany is aging more quickly

Germany looks set to lose around 12 million inhabitants by mid-century – even if one assumes an immigration surplus of 100,000 people a year. Both the absolute number and the percentage of persons of working age will decline especially sharply. At the same time, more people will be 65 or older. The ratio between different age groups will hence change considerably. Whereas today there are around 32 people of pension age to every 100 people of working age, by 2050 this figure will almost have doubled, to 60. In Canada the population is also becoming older, but the process is much less advanced than in Germany (see the following page). One reason for this is that the average number of children per woman is higher in Canada than in Germany – 1.61 versus 1.36 in 2011.**¹⁰


Population structure of Germany and Canada by five-year age group, in 2010, 2025 and 2050, as a percentage of the total population and the population of working age (shown in red)

(Based on data from: Statistisches Bundesamt;¹¹ Statistics Canada¹²)


Germany 2010



Germany 2025



Germany 2050



* The results of the 2011 census led to a downward revision of the total population figure by 1.5 million inhabitants. This reassessment was undertaken between 2010 and 2011.


** The total fertility rate is expressed here in simplified terms as the average number of children per woman. It is a hypothetical measurement used to draw conclusions about the fertility behaviour of female cohorts based on developments in a single calendar year. A better measure is the cohort fertility rate, which gives the actual average number of children born to every woman. These data only become available once women have finished having their families, i.e. when they are about 45.

in Germany.¹³ The only reason that the population continued to grow until 2002 was immigration. But since the gap between births and deaths is becoming wider, immigrants will no longer be able to compensate for the natural decrease in the future.


The population in Germany will not only shrink, it will also become older. Contrary to the general population trend, the number of people over 64 will increase – from 17.1 million in 2013 to almost 23 million in 2050. So by mid-century one person in three in Germany will belong to this age group. At that point, one person in seven will be over 80. Parallel to this, by 2050 the number of people of (today's) working age – i.e. between 15 and 64 – will decrease from 53.5 million to below 39 million. This massive reduction in the potential working population will really start to accelerate at the beginning of the next decade. That is when the first large baby boom cohort will

reach the current statutory retirement age, ushering in an enormous retirement wave, for the almost 14 million people aged between 45 and 55 today account for more than a quarter of the current potential workforce. The steadily declining cohorts that will follow them will not be able to compensate for the loss of labour. Particularly in the years from 2025 to 2035 the potential workforce will become considerably smaller, and from then on will continue to decrease by more than 500,000 people a year.¹⁴


Canada 2010



Canada 2025



Canada 2050



The hidden reserve and support from abroad

What can we do to counteract the threatened loss in the workforce and the negative economic consequences associated with this? One possibility is to bring more of the people already living in Germany into employment. Of the more than 53.5 million people of working age, 12 million are currently not available to the labour market.¹⁵ Alongside school pupils and students, these are mainly women and older people. Particularly the last two groups mentioned constitute a kind of "hidden reserve" for the labour market. Were they to be activated they could cushion the shrinkage of labour force.

Indeed, this is precisely what has been happening in the past few years: whereas at the millennium only 63 percent of all women of working age were employed or seeking work, this percentage had risen to almost 72 percent by 2012. The increase in the labour force participation was even greater in the 55–64 age group – from just under 43 to over 65 percent.¹⁶ Currently, just under 42 million people in Germany are either employed or seeking work.

Although the trend towards more women and older people working is likely to continue over the next few decades – better arrangements for combining a career and family and the raising of the retirement age are major contributing factors here – this will still not stop the decline in the labour force from accelerating. In fact, this will not even occur if female participation in the workforce reaches the same level as male by 2050, if 75 percent of people aged between 55 and 64 become available for work; and if the retirement age is raised to 67, bringing 65- and 66-year-olds into the labour force. These factors combined would


actually only offset the expected decline in the labour force by 2050 by just under 2.5 million people. Without immigration the supply of labour would decrease by almost 12 million people compared with the 2011 level.*

In order to make sustainable development of the supply of labour possible, Germany will have to recruit more labour from abroad.¹⁸ For this to happen, the annual immigration surplus of around 100,000 people over the past decade would have to rise considerably.

Activating previously unused potential will not be sufficient

How many people are available for work in the coming decades will depend largely on the development of the labour force participation rate and on immigration. If the participation rate remains stuck at the current level and Germany has no immigration surplus over the next few years, the supply of workers will fall to under 27 million by 2050. A rising participation rate and an average immigration surplus of 200,000 people per year could weaken the decline, so that in 2050 there would still be a workforce of 35.2 million people.

Millions



Development of the labour force according to various scenarios until 2050
(own calculations on the basis of figures from the Statistisches Bundesamt¹⁷)

* These figures are based on the following assumptions: a constant fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman; an increase in life expectancy to 85.0 for newborn boys and 89.2 for girls in the year 2060; an annual immigration surplus of 100,000 people from 2014 and of 200,000 people from 2020. In the scenario where employment rates remain constant it is assumed that participation of women and men of all age groups in the workforce will remain at the 2012 level until 2050. In the scenario where participation rates increase it is assumed that women aged 25–54 will reach a participation rate of 93 percent in 2050 and then be on a par with their male contemporaries. A female participation rate of 53 percent for the 15–24 age group would also bring women into line with the rate for men. A rise in the participation rate of 55- to 64-year-olds to 75 percent is also assumed. This rise would be an even and steady increase over the whole period. This also takes account of the gradual introduction of retirement at 67. Here it is assumed that the participation rates for 65- and 66-year-olds will be 39.3 percent for both sexes in 2050 – the same rate as that for 63- and 64-year-old men today.

Were it to double to 200,000 and were the labour force participation rate to increase, 35.2 million people would be available for work in 2050. The decline in the supply of labour could then be limited to around six million people, assuming that the population of Germany declines by eight million people over the same period.¹⁹

These calculations show that even a marked increase in labour force participation and in the immigration surplus will not be able to halt the demographically determined decline

Contrary developments


Whereas Germany's population will decline in the future, Canada's is likely to go on growing – from 35 million inhabitants today to 49 million in 2050. Even today, most of Canada's annual population growth is attributable to immigration. In the future this will even be the only source of population growth, since in Canada, too, women have an average of less than 2.1 children.

What are highly qualified workers?

Germany wants to recruit more highly qualified workers from abroad, but which group of immigrants does this term actually refer to? There is no objective definition, since what is perceived as highly qualified by the public and policymakers can sometimes change very quickly. The 2005 Immigration Act linked the definition of highly qualified workers to annual gross salary – at the time at least 85,500 euros. The new regulations for obtaining the EU Blue Card, however, now define certain occupational groups as highly qualified if they have an annual salary of at least 36,192 euros. This study defines highly qualified not in terms of salary but according to educational criteria. The only obligatory precondition for being classified as highly qualified is to have tertiary education.

How can we distinguish between highly qualified people and the equally sought-after group of skilled workers (*Fachkräfte*)? After all, someone with a university degree in engineering is exactly the kind of skilled worker Germany is looking for – but at the same time, he or she is also highly qualified according to our definition. The only condition for defining someone as skilled is that they should at least have completed a vocational training – but they may also have a degree. Thus, highly qualified people are always also skilled. The group of skilled workers embraces a broad spectrum of professions – from nurses to the engineers already mentioned. It can be roughly divided into highly qualified skilled workers (those with a degree) and workers with low- or mid-level qualifications (those who have completed vocational training).

Population in millions



Population of Canada and Germany, 1972 to 2050 (projections from 2012 for Germany, from 2013 for Canada)

(Based on data from:
Statistisches
Bundesamt; Statistics
Canada²⁰)

in the size of the labour force. Crucial, however, is not just the number of people available for employment, but that these people actually find jobs. While the decline in the size of the labour force ought generally to improve the prospects for job-seekers, this does not necessarily imply full employment. Labour market demand will increasingly shift in the direction of more highly qualified persons. People without professional training are likely in the future to find it even harder to get a job, and it is therefore entirely possible that we will see both a shortage of skilled labour and continuing unemployment.

It is already evident today that some groups suffer more unemployment than others. This applies above all to people with a so-called migration background, whose schooling or professional training is often deficient. Only just under 53 percent of 15- to 64-year-old women in this group are engaged in gainful

employment – more than 15 percentage points below those who do not have a migration background. For men the figures are only slightly better. Their employment rate lies at just under 68 percent, around nine percentage points below that of native Germans. At the same time, 13 percent of people with a migration background are unemployed – double the rate of natives.²¹

In the future, even more than today, qualifications are likely to determine a person's success on the labour market. Immigrants whose skills match the requirements of the market will have the best employment prospects and will be in the best position to alleviate the expected shortage of labour and of skilled workers.

More immigration secures jobs and social security systems

Many people fear that more immigration will excessively depress wages and squeeze native workers out of the market. The result, they believe, would be lower pay and higher unemployment among the native population. Meta analyses of the experience that various countries have had with immigration, however, have shown that in the past these fears have generally proven unwarranted. Even in the short term the native workforce suffered neither significant wage cuts nor job losses – and in the long term they may even benefit from more immigration.²²

After the recruitment of labour from abroad was officially curtailed in 1973, German immigration policy generally sought to bar foreign workers from participating in the domestic labour market. Exceptions to the general halt on recruitment were permitted on an ad-hoc basis. Model calculations

Canada as a model

Because of their many social benefits and their comparatively low level of income inequality, both Canada and Germany attract more poorly qualified immigrants than, say, the United States. In order to attract highly qualified people as well, the state needs to actively recruit them. Canada has already been doing this for several decades. Germany, on the other hand, for a long time pursued a very passive immigration policy.

		State migration policy	
General economic and social policy incentives		Policy of managed immigration designed to recruit highly qualified workers	No or little direction or focus in immigration policy
	Small welfare state		
	Large welfare state	Canada	← Germany

(Own illustration based on: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration²³)

concerning the German labour market show, however, that there is a high price to pay for such a short-sighted policy, for it is precisely the immigration of young, highly qualified workers that ought to reduce unemployment in Germany in the long-term and lead to wage increases for native German workers. As the number of qualified employees increases, the demand for other workers rises as well – even for those with lower qualifications. Thus, the better qualified the immigrant workers are, the more positive the effect on the domestic labour market.²⁴

Another frequently voiced fear is of “immigration to claim social benefits”. According to this view, immigrants cost more in the social benefits paid out to them than they contribute in the form of taxes and social security contributions. Reality presents a rather different picture, however; despite their higher rate of unemployment, the financial contribution of the foreign population is positive. In the middle of the last decade the per capita annual taxes and

contributions paid by foreigners (not necessarily all persons with a migration background) living in Germany exceeded the level of transfer payments by an average of 2,000 euros. At the time there were 7.2 million foreigners in Germany, yielding a surplus of around 14 billion euros. This surplus is, however, also due to the very favourable age structure of the foreign population.²⁵ In the future the average age of this population is likely to rise, posing a greater cost factor than it does now. All the more important, then, to increase the immigrant employment rate through higher qualifications and better integration. Under these conditions the benefits for the public purse could even rise considerably.²⁶

Benefiting from the experience of other countries

How will Germany be able to attract more young and well-qualified people in the future? And what measures need to be taken to integrate immigrants and their children in the labour market as smoothly as possible? Taking a look at countries with a history of immigration might provide some answers to these questions. Countries like Australia and Canada have been pursuing an active immigration policy for some time now, and particularly in recent years, the aging of their populations has played a growing role in how this policy is shaped. In addition, they have proven very successful in competing for the best brains.

Canada is particularly suitable for comparison with Germany because both countries have high social standards, attracting poorly qualified immigrants who have only slim chances of employment. Countries with greater income inequality and less regulated labour markets, like the United States, tend to attract immigrants who assume they will be successful on the labour market. Since neither Canada nor Germany benefits from this selection principle, they must pursue a targeted immigration policy to cover their need for highly qualified labour.²⁷

Canada was one of the first countries to develop an active immigration policy. As the second-largest country in the world in terms of area, Canada's initial aim was to populate its largely empty territory and to make use of its huge areas of arable land. Following numerous reforms and changes of direction the Canadian government is now trying to recruit well-qualified people with a high level of skills who can help the economy make the leap into a knowledge society. To do this it uses a points system which selects potential immigrants on the basis of their qualifications, skills and age. In this respect Canada differs from Germany, where only very few non-EU citizens are permitted to

enter the country without a work contract. What is more, Canada recognised early on that an active integration policy is a precondition for the success of immigrants. In view of its broad-ranging experience, taking a close look at Canadian policy is likely to bring a wealth of insights.

But where precisely do the differences between German and Canadian immigration and integration policy lie? And how successful have the efforts of the two countries been? Can particularly effective measures and programs be identified that might explain a possible gap between the two countries? The answers to these questions should elucidate how far Germany should follow the Canadian model in formulating a new immigration policy.

Germany and Canada: an overview

	Germany	Canada
Population in millions, 2012	81.8 (80.5)*	34.8
Projected population in millions, 2050	69.4	48.6
Annual population growth in percent, mean 2002–2011	–0.1	+1.0
Percentage of people aged 15–64, 2012	66.1	68.9
Projected percentage of people aged 15–64, 2050	55.6	59.8
Number of immigrants living in the country, 2011	10.7	6.9
Percentage of immigrants living in the country, 2011	13.1	20.1
Annual migration surplus per 1,000 inhabitants, mean 2007–2011	0.9	7.6**

(Based on data from: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistics Canada, OECD, United Nations)

* The results of the 2011 census led to a downward revision of the total population figure by 1.5 million inhabitants. This reassessment was undertaken between 2010 and 2011.

** In Canada the data refer to a period from 1 July to 30 June of the following year, whereas in Germany the figures are always for a calendar year.

CANADA – A CLASSIC IMMIGRATION COUNTRY

“A European nation on American soil” was how many Canadians described their country until well into the second half of the 20th century. Between 1896 and 1914 alone, more than three million people came to Canada to help build the economy of the young state. Around half of them were British, but those who crossed the Atlantic in their hundreds of thousands also included Germans, Ukrainians and many other Europeans.²⁸ The new arrivals found employment above all in agriculture in the far west of the country. The steady stream of labour meant the population grew at an average of 2.3 percent a year in those days – a rate attained today by developing countries like Ghana or Nigeria.²⁹

From the beginning Canadians regarded immigration both as a means of economic development and as a way of expanding the Canadian nation in its largely empty territory. Immigrants therefore as a rule received a permanent residence permit with a clear prospect of soon becoming Canadian citizens; temporarily employed foreigners – known as migrant workers – were a small minority. In its nation-building bid, for a long time the government followed a “White Canada” strategy, giving preference to immigrants from Britain, France and the

United States or from other European countries, while making it difficult for other nationalities, especially Chinese and Indians, to enter Canada.³⁰

Initially, this policy remained unchanged in the post-war period. Although the Great Depression had left the population feeling resentful towards immigrants, the government decided to push ahead with an immigration-driven path of development. Unlike in the pre-1914 period, however, it was now the country’s industry – protected by high customs tariffs – that was to be made internationally competitive through migrant labour.³¹

The tide of immigration only began to ebb in the late 1950s as Europe slowly started to recover from the aftermath of the war. Well-qualified people, who had previously been prepared to cross the Atlantic, now found that they could make a living more easily in their own countries. At the same time, the Canadian economy experienced a slowdown, and unemployment rose. People with low qualifications, who made up an ever-


increasing share of immigrants, were particularly susceptible to losing their jobs. Increasing numbers of highly qualified Canadians, in turn, emigrated to the United States.³² In order not to endanger a growth model that was dependent on immigration, Canada was forced to consider other states as sources of immigration.

From White Canada to the points system

In 1962, Canada stopped selecting its immigrants on the basis of country of origin, and qualifications became the key criterion. Many observers believe that foreign policy ambitions played a role in this decision alongside motives determined by domestic policy. After all, Canada’s ambition to be taken seriously as a political actor on the world stage would, in view of the emerging international mood of anti-racism, have been difficult to reconcile with an openly discriminatory immigration policy.³³

In 1967, Canada introduced a points system to select immigrants which, to this day, continues to be the centrepiece of its immigration policy, albeit in a slightly different form. Back then, applicants needed to obtain at least half (now two-thirds) of the maximum possible points on a scale from 0 to 140 (now 100) in order to be categorised as skilled workers and to receive permanent residence. Applicants scored points for their profession, their education, their language skills and for having relatives already in Canada. Each year the Canadian government laid down the precise number of residency permits to be granted on the basis of economic forecasts.³⁴ To this day, candidates for immigration to Canada have to prove that they have sufficient means to support themselves and their families for the first few months after their arrival in the country. Currently, this level is set at just under 10,000 euros for a single immigrant without dependents.³⁵

In the first decade of the points system, most immigrants continued to come from Britain, but every year several thousand people also arrived from Vietnam, India, the Philippines, Jamaica and Hong Kong.³⁷ The European share of all immigrants thus fell rapidly: whereas in 1960, 80 percent of all new arrivals came from Europe, a decade later this figure had fallen to 54 percent, and by 1980 was only 29 percent. Over the same period, the share of immigrants from Asia rose from 5 to 14 percent and then to 50 percent.³⁸



Asia replaces Europe

In 1960, almost 90 percent of all immigrants to Canada came from Europe or the United States. This changed rapidly following the new direction taken by immigration policy from 1962 onwards. Particularly Asians flooded into Canada in ever larger numbers; they now make up around 60 percent of all new arrivals. The share of Europeans, on the other hand, has fallen to barely 15 percent.

Percentage of groups of immigrants to Canada by region of origin, 1960 to 2010
 (Data source:
 Statistics Canada.³⁶)

- Europe
- Asia
- USA
- Other
- Africa
- South and Central America

The officially propagated image of a bi-cultural nation consisting of Canadians of British and French origin was soon no longer reconcilable with a Canada that was rapidly becoming ethnically far more mixed. The idea of a melting pot, as the United States defined its society, found little support in Canada – among other reasons because the francophone minority did not want to lose their special status. Although not particularly popular with the French-speaking population either, the idea of a multicultural society provided a solution, and in 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau made this his government's official policy.³⁹ He sought to use targeted programs that would encourage inter-cultural exchange and thus enable all ethnic groups to become full members of society.⁴⁰ His policy proved successful: today many Canadians describe their nation as a mosaic, rather than a melting pot, in which every citizen makes his or her own special cultural contribution to the whole.⁴¹

Immigration designed to be long term

In the late 1980s, the need for industrial workers declined and the Canadian economy opened itself more to the world market. The government once again changed the direction of its policy, increasing the number of immigrants and seeking to recruit more highly qualified people by changing the weighting of the points system in favour of higher educational qualifications. Its perspective also became more long term, most clearly illustrated by the fact that the level of immigration was no longer tied directly to the state of the economy.⁴²

With its stronger focus on highly qualified immigrants, the ratios shifted between the three different immigration categories – economic, family, and refugees. Whereas in 1986, 43 percent of all permanent immigrants came to Canada to join family already living there, ten years later this figure had fallen to only 30 percent and has meanwhile fallen further still, to 25 percent. Nowadays, two-thirds of new arrivals to Canada come for economic reasons.⁴³

Alongside the principal applicant, they also include family members, who make up around 60 percent of all economic immigrants. De facto, then, just over a quarter of all permanent immigrants to Canada receive a residence permit for employment reasons.⁴⁴ But since the families of the principal applicant also have a high level of education on average, they are also of interest to the labour market.

Within the economic category the opportunities for coming to Canada have become ever more numerous in recent years. Although the Federal Skilled Worker Program – as the points system is officially called – is still the centrepiece of immigration policy, individual provinces can now select a certain number of immigrants directly via the so-called Provincial Nominee Programs.* Entrepreneurs, investors and self-employed persons are placed in a special category, as are

professional caregivers, who can initially come to Canada on a temporary residence permit under the Live-in Caregiver Program; the latter belong to the economic category as soon as they receive permanent residence. And finally, there are two new categories. In 2008 the Canadian government introduced the so-called Canadian Experience Class – immigrants with a temporary residence permit and foreign graduates of Canadian universities who are given the opportunity to change their status to that of permanent residents. In 2013, the government started yet another immigration program, the Federal


Skilled Trades Program, which grants permanent residence to a certain number of skilled tradespeople every year.

Provinces co-determine immigration

An important development in the last decade has been the delegation of various immigration responsibilities to the provinces. As long ago as 1991, via the Canada–Quebec Accord, Quebec was granted the right by the government in Ottawa to select its immigrants completely independently of the central government. Later the provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba signed agreements giving them broad autonomy in the field of integration. And starting in the late 1990s, some provinces acquired the option of selecting some of their immigrants themselves via the Provincial Nominee Programs. Unlike Quebec, however, immigration in these provinces generally continued to fall under national immigration policy.

A greater focus on labour

In the early 1990s, members of the family category (immigrants who moved to Canada to join their families) were still numerically the largest group of immigrants. Now, however, the economic category accounts for about two-thirds of immigration, while the government has introduced stricter regulations governing immigration for family reasons. In considering the figures one should bear in mind that around 60 percent of immigrants in the economic category enter Canada as dependents of the principal applicant.



Permanent immigration to Canada by category, 1986 to 2012
(Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada⁴⁵)

Today, Provincial Nominee Programs exist in all Canadian provinces. Common to all of them is that the provincial government “nominates” potential immigrants to the central government. The government in Ottawa approves these nominations, as long as the candidates pass the obligatory security check and medical. Although nominees are selected by individual provinces, once approved they are free to settle in whichever part of Canada they want.

There are, however, major differences between the provinces when it comes to selecting nominees. Even within one and the same province there are different immigration options. Altogether, Canada currently has around 60 different immigration channels under the Provincial Nominee Programs. Unlike the federal points system, many of them are conditional on the applicant having a concrete job offer.


In recent years the importance of Provincial Nominee Programs has steadily increased. Whereas in 2002 the provinces, excluding Quebec, selected only 2,000 immigrants or 2 percent of all immigrants in the economic category themselves, by 2012 this figure had risen to almost 41,000 people or 25 percent.⁴⁶ In the course of this growth, the most popular destinations of the immigrants have changed. Whereas the province of Ontario receives almost two-thirds of all immigrants recruited via the points system (thanks to the major city of Toronto), only about 4 percent of the Provincial Nominees come to Ontario, while more than half of them go to the less populated provinces of Manitoba and Alberta.⁴⁷

Alongside the Provincial Nominee Programs, the number and variety of programs for temporary labour migration have also risen rapidly. In 2012, the number of new Temporary Foreign Workers reached the record level of 214,000.⁴⁸ Altogether, around 492,000 Temporary Foreign Workers were living in Canada in 2012, while in 2004 there were still fewer than 200,000.⁴⁹

Much of the growth in temporary labour migration can be attributed to the Canadian government's considerable expansion of its Work and Travel program for young people. More significant from an economic point of view, however, are those labour migrants who require what is termed a Labour Market Opinion in order to be able to take up employment in Canada. This is very similar to the German labour market test. Employers wishing to employ an immigrant on a temporary basis have to prove that they have been unable to find a native Canadian to fill the job and that the pay and working conditions are in line with regional standards; there is no annual cap on the number of work permits that can be issued. A positive Labour Market Opinion is required, among others, by seasonal workers in agriculture and nursing and care

Immigration stable at a high level

Until the 1990s, Canada's immigration figures fluctuated considerably depending on the economic situation. Since the government's decision to pursue a longer-term policy, the number of permanent immigrants has stabilised at around 250,000 people annually. The number of temporary migrants has, by contrast, grown rapidly over the past two decades. In the early 1990s, temporary migration was still at a level comparable with permanent immigration, but temporary migrants meanwhile exceed permanent ones by around 170,000 persons annually. Among the almost 420,000 who migrated temporarily to Canada in 2012, there were around 210,000 Temporary Foreign Workers. Altogether, over a million people with temporary residence permits were living in Canada in 2012.



Number of permanent and temporary immigrants to Canada, 1950 to 2012
(Based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada data⁵⁰)

professionals who come to Canada under the Live-In Caregiver Program. But it also includes IT professionals as well as people with low qualifications from various sectors who have been participating in the Pilot Project for Occupations Requiring Lower Levels of Formal Training launched in 2002. The latter are mainly people working in the oil sands industry and in the meat processing sector in the three prairie provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan.⁵¹ The number of temporary migrants requiring a Labour Market Opinion doubled after 2000 from around 50,000 to almost 100,000 in 2008. Owing to the financial crisis and resulting economic crisis, the number fell again in the following four years to around 80,000.⁵²

Whereas highly qualified labour migrants who initially receive a temporary visa for Canada are generally allowed to apply for permanent residency via the Canadian Experience Class, people with low and average qualifications often do not have a long-term future in the country. The only route for them to obtain permanent residency is via certain Provincial Nominee Programs or in some cases by having relatives already living in Canada.* Otherwise they have to leave Canada at the latest after four years

* Exceptions to this rule are Live-in Caregivers, who generally have the option of receiving permanent residence after working in Canada for two years.

and may only enter the country again after a further four years have elapsed.^{*53} In 2012 a total of about 79,000 migrants with temporary residence permits managed to convert these into permanent residency. Around 38,000 of them had previously worked in Canada as Temporary Foreign Workers; the rest had come to Canada mainly for humanitarian reasons.⁵⁴

* Exceptions apply to certain groups of immigrants. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012). Information for foreign workers in Canada on the Temporary Foreign Worker Program regulatory changes. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/tfw.asp> (retrieved: 10 April 2012)

High levels of immigration – many granted citizenship


Although the Canadian government has changed its selection criteria for immigrants considerably over the past decade, this has made little dent in the high annual immigration figures. In 2010, the number of newly granted permanent residence permits reached 281,000, the highest level since 1957. In the past two years the figure has fallen slightly again to 258,000.⁵⁵ The greatest numbers of immigrants now come from China, India and the Philippines with up to 40,000 persons a year.⁵⁶

Between 100,000 and 200,000 immigrants now take Canadian citizenship every year.⁵⁷ Relative to the population as a whole, these

figures are higher than in any other OECD country.⁵⁸ This is the result of regulations that are very liberal by international comparison. Canada has permitted multiple nationality since 1977, and immigrants can apply for citizenship two years after receiving permanent residency. To qualify, they must have lived in Canada for the previous four years and be able to communicate in English or French. If more than two years have expired since they received permanent residency the procedure is even simpler. Then the applicant only needs to have spent three out of the previous four years in Canada. Adults between the ages of 18 and 54 must also pass a citizenship test.⁵⁹

Routes to permanent residency in Canada for labour migrants

Immediate permanent residency is granted mainly to highly qualified people either via the points system or the Provincial Nominee Programs or if they come to Canada as entrepreneurs, investors or freelancers. Converting temporary residency into permanent is more difficult. Like care professionals or graduates from Canadian universities, however, they have no automatically guaranteed right to permanent residency after spending a certain amount of time in Canada.



3

GERMANY – A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION

In 1955, Germany signed a treaty with Italy governing the recruitment of workers, which saw primarily Italian men from the south of the country with few qualifications coming to work in the German agricultural and hotel sectors. Whereas employers had previously sourced employees abroad on their own, now there were German commissions to tackle the same task based in Italy itself. Later treaties with Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) brought additional employees, above all to the mining and construction industries.

The largest contingent of foreign workers came from Turkey. In 1968, when Germany temporarily recruited fewer workers owing to the first post-war recession, there were already over 600,000 Turks living in what was then West Germany.⁶⁰ The history of the recruitment treaty with Turkey clearly shows that Germany initially resisted actively hiring foreign workers. This is because, as with all the other treaties, it had been initiated not by Germany but by the workers' country of origin. The Turkish government hoped that

the remittances sent back by migrants would improve the negative balance of payments with West Germany. Moreover, it wished to relieve pressure on the Turkish labour market in the short term, and in the long term sought to profit from the know-how that returning migrants would have acquired in Germany.⁶¹


Far from perceiving itself as a country of immigration, Germany saw immigration as a temporary measure to overcome its labour shortage. The Turkish "guest workers", as they were soon dubbed in the media and by politicians, were initially only issued a work permit for two years. Once this period had elapsed the workers were to be replaced by others according to a rotational system. Moreover, family members were explicitly forbidden from moving to Germany to join their relatives.⁶²

A new version of the German-Turkish treaty in 1964 abolished these restrictions and opened the way for economic immigrants to remain in the country indefinitely. The move was initiated by employers' associations, which pointed out that Turkish employees produced a high standard of work and that repeatedly training new workers was proving to be a costly business.

Yet permanent residence was not officially intended in the new 1964 treaty; neither was it envisaged in 1971, when residence permits were made much easier to extend and increasing numbers of immigrants brought their families to Germany. The trend towards temporary immigrants staying permanently in Germany thus developed very gradually and almost went unnoticed. The German constitutional court, for instance, bolstered the rights of foreign workers in a number of rulings during the 1970s and 1980s, meaning that their right to stay was no longer dependent on their employment status.⁶³

Fluctuations in immigration

Since the end of the Second World War immigrants have come to Germany in waves. At the peak of the “guest worker immigration” in 1970 there was a migration surplus of over half a million people. In contrast, a net total of up to 200,000 people left Germany annually during the recessions of the early 1970s and 1980s. Following the record levels of immigration in the mid-1990s, when predominantly *Spätaussiedler* (repatriating ethnic Germans) resettled in Germany, immigration was relatively low for a considerable time and has only risen again in the last three years. The most recent rise cannot, however, be explained by a policy of managed immigration. Rather, many citizens of other EU countries have relocated to Germany because it has been less severely affected by the financial crisis.



Immigration despite a halt to recruitment

When the oil crisis slowed down the German economy in 1973, the government stopped recruiting labour from abroad. By this point, four million foreigners were living in Germany, 2.6 million of whom were wage earners. This comprised around 12 percent of all workers in West Germany (excluding the self-employed).⁶⁵ In total, around a fifth of all guest workers who had come to Germany settled in the country permanently.⁶⁶

Most of these foreigners were poorly qualified and consequently more severely affected by the crisis than native Germans. However, this did not mean that they

returned to their home countries in droves, as many observers had expected, for the halt to recruitment would have then prevented them from re-entering West Germany. In fact, quite the opposite was the case: increasing numbers of foreigners brought their relatives from their countries of origin, and thus Germany recorded more immigration than emigration over the following decade, too.⁶⁷ At a political level, the main reaction was to limit further immigration and offer incentives for foreigners already resident in Germany to return to their home countries, but tentative attempts were also made to integrate the newcomers and initiate employment programs.⁶⁸

In the early 1980s, the public debate on immigration increasingly turned to matters of national security and away from labour market considerations. One reason for this was the rising tally of refugees seeking asylum in Germany, particularly from the

former Eastern Bloc countries, and later from Yugoslavia as it disintegrated.⁶⁹ Parallel to the growth in refugee numbers was the increase in repatriating ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*, since 1993 officially known as *Spätaussiedler* or “late repatriating” Germans) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As ethnic Germans they returned to the land of their ancestors, mainly coming from eastern Europe and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. This was made possible by the provisions of the Federal Displaced Persons Act of 1953. Whereas in the first three and a half decades (until 1987) only 1.4 million ethnic Germans resettled in Germany, during the following 17 years between 1998 and 2005 that figure increased to around three million.⁷⁰

Subsequently the numbers plummeted, and in 2011 a mere 2,148 ethnic German immigrants were registered.⁷¹ While this drop was partly due to the introduction of much tougher conditions for those hoping to resettle in Germany, it is equally true that most resettlers wishing to move to Germany had already done so.

In the 1990s, only a few selected occupations were exempted from the recruitment ban with a dispensation that allowed non-EU citizens to come to Germany for a limited period. The people most affected by this were seasonal, temporary and contractual workers from central and eastern Europe, who were permitted to work in Germany on the basis of bilateral treaties.⁷² Nowadays, the regulations governing these exemptions have been integrated into the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) and the Employment Regulation (*Beschäftigungsverordnung*).

The idea of actively recruiting workers with particular expertise first gained popularity in the late 1990s, when the IT sector experienced a boom. Whereas the guest workers, and later the seasonal workers, were still predominantly recruited from the ranks of the low qualified, the Social Democrat and Green coalition government under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder launched a Green Card initiative that marked something of a sea change in German migration policy – albeit an extremely cautious one. The Green Card program aimed to encourage foreign IT professionals to come to Germany as a way of eliminating the deficit of skilled employees in the industry. The immigrants, however, were restricted to working for a maximum of five years in Germany, and no more than 20,000

visas were to be issued over a three-year period. Moreover, applicants either needed a degree in IT or communications, or they had to earn a guaranteed minimum salary of 51,000 euros in Germany.⁷³

Experts believe there are several reasons why only 17,931 residence and work visas were actually issued, effectively failing to meet the allotted target. For one thing, there was the economic downturn after 2001, and for another, the restrictive conditions placed upon residency made other countries more attractive for potential applicants.⁷⁴ What is more, since 1998 large companies had already been able to transfer skilled existing employees from other countries for a 24-month period – up to 60 months for managers – without requiring a labour market test. In practice, it was therefore primarily small and medium-sized companies with up to 500 employees that took advantage of the Green Card.⁷⁵


A change of direction with the Immigration Act?

On 1 January 2005 the Immigration Act came into effect, a main element of which was the Residence Act that replaced the 1990 Aliens Act. One effect of the Residence Act was to reduce the number of residence titles from four to two; now the sole distinction is between permanent residence permits (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*) that are not tied to a particular function and temporary residence permits (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*) for a specified purpose. A temporary residence permit can be converted into a permanent one after a minimum of five years living in Germany. The Act also created a system dubbed “One-Stop-Government” enabling immigration offices to issue both job permits and residence permits, whereas previously two separate applications had been necessary.⁷⁶

The introduction of Section 19 governing the immigration of highly qualified workers was a further innovation. This section deals with “scientists and scholars with special technical knowledge”, “teaching personnel in prominent positions or scientific/scholarly personnel in prominent positions” and “skilled workers and executive personnel with special professional experience”, all of whom are directly entitled to permanent residence if they can provide evidence of a concrete job offer. Skilled workers and executives used to have to show in addition that they earned at least 85,000 euros gross per year, but this is no longer required.⁷⁷

Lower levels of immigration from non-EU states

Immigration from the European Economic Area and Switzerland increased Germany's population by just under 265,000 in 2012. In contrast, managed migration from non-EU countries increased the population by a mere 105,000, most of whom came to join family members.



In addition to regulations governing entry and exit requirements for immigrants to Germany, as well as the length of time they can stay, the Residence Act also includes provisions to foster integration. This is principally to be achieved through integration courses that aim to “successfully teach foreigners the German language, legal system, culture and history”.⁷⁹

Particularly the provisions of the Immigration Act governing residence in Germany were far less revolutionary than the draft version might have led one to expect. Derived from the findings of the Independent Commission on Immigration to Germany, these had proposed the introduction of a points-based system along the lines of the Canadian model, which would enable labour migration to be steered in a manner that was both transparent and appropriate to requirements. In this scenario, a concrete job offer would thus no longer be a precondition for entering Germany.⁸⁰ The ambivalence of the Immigration Act, and its reluctance to be seen as sending a clear signal of openness to the wider world, is most clearly illustrated by its full title: “Act for the Management and Limitation of Immigration and for Regulation of the Residency and Integration of Citizens of the European Union and Foreigners”.⁸¹

Still few skilled workers immigrating to Germany


So how many of these internationally sought-after skilled workers do actually come to Germany? It is far from easy to determine this figure, for entry to the country is regulated by different sections of the Residence Act. The 1,217 people who entered Germany between 2005 and 2011 via Section 19, which explicitly addresses highly qualified workers, are only one of several categories of skilled workers permitted to enter the country. During the same period, namely, 6,915 self-employed people also came to Germany via Section 21. People in this category are

generally entitled to a temporary residence permit if they invest at least 250,000 euros in Germany and create five jobs.* Finally, since 2009, scholars engaged in research have been able to apply for a temporary residence permit according to the provisions of Section 20; in the first three years of the Act’s existence, however, a mere 668 people made use of this option.⁸²

* In 2011, however, more than two-thirds of the self-employed were freelancers, for whom these conditions do not apply.

Hardly any immigration from non-EU countries

Only one in eight immigrants from a non-EU country is granted a residence title in connection with employment. As few as one in a thousand immigrants is granted a permanent residence permit directly upon entering Germany under the terms of Section 19 of the Residence Act. Once emigration (which is not depicted in the graph) is deducted, all that remains is a very low surplus of skilled workers from non-EU countries. However, it is important to remember that many immigrants in other categories are also available for work in Germany.




Immigration to Germany by non-EU citizens by purpose of stay, 2010** (Data source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Office for Migration and Refugees⁸³)

** The category “Other” principally comprises people with an EU residence title or people who have applied for a residence title. The graph thus also includes immigration from other EU states, but only by non-EU citizens.

Immigration figures are somewhat higher for other workers. According to Section 18 of the Residence Act, foreigners with a range of professions can enter Germany for an initially limited period. In order to meet the requirements, most applicants (there are some exceptions) have to pass a labour market test, which checks that their employment would not have a detrimental effect on the German job market and that the applicant would be employed under the same terms and conditions as a German. The latter criterion is intended to prevent excessively low wages and lower standards of social provisions being introduced for foreign workers. In addition, immigrants in several occupations have to pass a priority check, which confirms that there is no candidate who is equally or better qualified for the post either within Germany or in the other EU countries, which receive preferential treatment.⁸⁴

Currently, around 36,000 people enter Germany annually under the terms of Section 18 of the Residence Act. Almost three-quarters of these are men, and they come from a far greater variety of countries than the highly qualified workers covered by Section 19. Two-thirds of the immigrants are skilled workers, while the remaining third work without having completed a formal training program. In total, only one in eight immigrants from non-EU countries receives a residence title for work purposes, whereas this figure is over one in four in Canada.⁸⁵

Complicated legal framework for labour immigration in Germany



The immigration of workers from non-EU countries is governed by four separate sections of the Residence Act. Most people who come to Germany each year do

(Own diagram, as of 2012)

Large migration flows within the EU

It is difficult to measure the extent to which immigration and emigration of highly qualified Germans affects the migration balance. Studies indicate, however, that the effect is likely to be minimal because the majority of emigrants return to Germany after a short period abroad.⁸⁶ It is generally important to remember that most immigrants to Germany come from the European Economic Area, and thus the latitude for active management is extremely limited.


In 2012, the population of Germany grew by 264,000 thanks to immigration from other EU countries.* The migration surplus from non-EU countries was a mere 105,000. For a number of years now the highest influx of immigrants has been recorded from Poland. Owing to the new freedom of movement for workers from EU-8 countries, this figure increased to 184,000 in 2012.

* The EU states are joined by Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, which also benefit from the freedom of movement within Europe. No separate data are available for Liechtenstein.

so via Section 18, for which – as with Sections 19 and 20 – they need a current job offer. The only direct route to a settlement permit to date has been via

Section 19, which is used by comparatively few people who enter Germany.

Economic Area or Switzerland. More than one in four “new Germans”, in contrast, used to be a Turkish citizen.⁹⁰



Admittedly, 114,000 people also migrated in the opposite direction during that period, from Germany to Poland.⁸⁷ This is because many Poles remain in Germany for no more than a few months, mostly employed as seasonal workers.⁸⁸ Germany also has a high migration surplus with Romania and Bulgaria, despite the fact that restrictions on the freedom of movement applied until 2014.⁸⁹

In the long term, however, the suitability of EU countries as sources for immigration is limited because their birth rates have also been extremely low for a considerable time, hence reducing the potential numbers of emigrants. Moreover, immigration from EU countries varies greatly depending on the current economic situation.

The fact that migrants, particularly within Europe, frequently follow short-term economic incentives is reflected by changes in the number of naturalisations from year to year. In 2012, for instance, only 20,000 of a total 112,000 people who took German citizenship – and hence defined Germany as their main home – came from the European

Economic Area or Switzerland. In order to take on German citizenship, immigrants must generally have legally resided in Germany for at least eight years and be in possession of a permanent residence permit. In addition, they have to fulfil a number of other conditions such as adequate language skills and the ability to support themselves and their families without relying on social welfare.* There is a basic principle that immigrants are obliged to give up their current nationality if they take German citizenship. Exemptions from this requirement, however, mean that in recent years slightly less than half of all new Germans were obliged to do so.⁹¹ According to Section 12 of the Nationality Act, it is possible to retain the existing nationality “if the foreigner is unable to give up his or her previous citizenship, or if doing so would entail particularly difficult conditions” or for someone who comes from the EU or Switzerland.⁹² Any children born to two foreigners in Germany who have at least one other nationality in addition to German must opt to retain German citizenship or the other nationality between the ages of 18 and 23 – this obligation to choose one or the other is called the *Optionspflicht*.⁹³

* Immigrants who successfully complete an integration course are entitled to citizenship after seven years in Germany, and those with exceptionally good language skills can take on German nationality after only six years.

Cautious opening up of the labour market

International students provide a large reservoir of immigrants. In the winter semester 2011/12 their numbers rose to 265,000, whereas a decade before that the figure was 206,000.⁹⁴ The federal government has recognised this potential and in recent years has made increasing efforts to enable recent graduates to enter the German labour market. Foreign graduates of German universities looking for work may currently remain in Germany up to 18 months. In other areas, too, the German government has in recent years relaxed the conditions for taking up employment. It has for example reduced the minimum salary required for highly qualified workers. What is more, doctors and certain kinds of engineers are no longer subject to the priority check and, somewhat belatedly in April 2012, the EU directive on highly qualified workers was transposed into national law with the EU Blue Card.


The EU Blue Card grants immigrants from non-EU countries a right of residence for an initial period of not more than four years, but immigrants with good German language skills can convert this into permanent residence after only two years. Yet evidence of a job offer in Germany is still a precondition for acquiring a Blue Card, and applicants must also be graduates and earn at least 46,400 euros gross per year. Highly qualified workers in certain professions where there is a labour deficit, such as engineers, doctors or IT and communications specialists, may earn the lower sum of 36,192 euros. This income criterion is significantly less stringent than the terms of Section 19 of the Residence Act previously governing the immigration of highly qualified workers, within which the Blue Card regulations have been embedded. One special feature of the Blue Card is that family members are also

Summary

- Up until the 1970s low-qualified “guest workers” from southern Europe and northern Africa dominated the influx of immigrants to Germany. After the recruitment stop, Germany continued to record migration surpluses thanks to the immigration of family members and ethnic German repatriation. Family members in particular brought primarily low-qualified people to Germany.
- A majority of immigrants nowadays come from other EU states. However, they frequently return to their home countries after several years and take German citizenship less often than non-EU citizens.
- Since the new millennium, the introduction of the Green Card, the Immigration Act and the EU Blue Card have signalled a return to an immigration policy for non-EU member states that is tailored to meet the needs of the labour market. Nevertheless, the immigration figures for specialists from non-EU states remain low.

Becoming a citizen is difficult

On average over the last decade 118,000 people have taken German citizenship each year. Most of these are immigrants from non-EU countries. Although far fewer people live in Canada than in Germany, the former has acquired between 140,000 and 260,000 new citizens annually over the past 10 years. This is not only because more people immigrate to Canada but also because the regulations governing the acquisition of citizenship are more liberal in Canada than in Germany.



granted unrestricted access to the German labour market. And it is a very notable innovation that for the very first time foreigners can enter Germany in order to find work without first having a job offer on the table, and they can stay for up to six months while looking for employment. The sole preconditions are an academic degree and sufficient financial support. In the first 11 months of the Blue Card's existence, the German government issued just under 9,000 of them, of which around 2,500 were granted to new arrivals.⁹⁵

4 IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS IN GERMANY AND CANADA

Whether and to what extent a country can benefit economically from its immigrants depends not only on how many immigrants it manages to attract, but also on what kind of qualifications immigrants bring with them and how well they and their children manage to integrate in the labour market. The following chapter will examine these questions using evaluations of the German micro-census of 2010 and existing analyses from Canada based on official statistics.

German studies of immigration and integration usually focus on the population with a migration background, defined as those who either do not have German citizenship or who were born abroad and immigrated after 1949 to the territory that is

now Germany or who have at least one parent to whom the second criterion applies.⁹⁶ In 2010, 15.7 million of Germany's 81.7 million inhabitants, or almost one person in five, had a migration background. Of those, 10.6 million "had directly experienced immigration" – i.e., had immigrated to Germany themselves. The remaining 5.1 million had at least one parent who was an immigrant.⁹⁷

Canadian statistics do not use "migration background" as a category but simply distinguish between immigrants and Canadians, in other words, between people with a permanent residence permit who have themselves immigrated and those born in Canada. One consequence of Canada's long history as a country of immigration is that the latter category often also includes second-, third- or nth-generation immigrants. At the same time, this distinction also illustrates the specifically Canadian culture of integration, whereby children with, say, Chinese or Congolese parents are de facto Canadians if


they were born in Canada. According to the most recent available census figures from 2006, of the 31.2 million inhabitants of Canada at that time, 6.2 million were born in another country.⁹⁸ The share of immigrants as a percentage of the total population was thus around 20 percent and hence considerably higher than in Germany, where according to the micro-census of 2010 a total of 12.3 million people or just under 15 percent of the population had moved to Germany from elsewhere.*

* The difference between the number of direct immigrants and the number of people with a migration background who have personally experienced immigration is accounted for by the category of ethnic Germans who immigrated to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany up to and including 1949, who are defined as immigrants but not as having a migration background.

Germany: most immigrants are of working age

In Germany, the age structure of native Germans and immigrants differs considerably. Whereas 85 percent of the immigrants are of working age (ages 15–64), the corresponding share of native Germans is only 65 percent. The age distribution of immigrants is therefore beneficial for the economy. This is firstly because it is still the case that a relatively small number of immigrants are old, and secondly, because the number of children who have immigrated is naturally rather small. The average age of immigrants is therefore higher than that of native Germans.

Population pyramid for Germany in 2010 showing the number of native Germans and immigrants (EU- and non-EU immigrants), per cohort, in 1,000s (Data source: Own calculations based on data from the Statistisches Bundesamt⁹⁹)



Young, well-educated immigrants – above all in Canada

But who are the immigrants in Germany and Canada? And how well are they integrated in the labour market? To find this out, one would ideally want to analyse the characteristics of precisely those immigrants who come to Germany or Canada to work. Unfortunately, the available data do not permit us to do this. We will therefore look at

the entire immigrant population irrespective of their residence title. In Germany this includes both immigrants from EU states and those from other countries. In order to make the data as comparable as possible, the immigrant population includes only those who have immigrated themselves and not the larger group of people with a migration background. Second-generation immigrants will therefore for the moment be counted as native Germans. We will also exclude all Germans born abroad, since in Canada, Canadians born abroad are not counted as immigrants either. In fact, they are categorised neither as immigrants nor as Canadians.*

One conspicuous finding is that immigrants tend to be younger than the average population when they arrive in Germany. In 2010, the average age of newcomers to Germany was 27.2 years, almost the same age as immigrants to Canada.¹⁰⁰ The average age of the rest of the population at that time was 42.3.¹⁰¹ Immigrants from non-EU states were particularly young, with an average age of

* Projections for the population as a whole based on the sub-groups studied in the micro-census have only limited validity. In interpreting the findings one should therefore bear in mind that these are based on the premise that the group we looked at in each case is representative of the population as a whole.

The Canadian and German data are not 100-percent comparable, since Canadian statistics do not include temporary migrants and there are also differences between the educational and vocational qualification obtainable in each country. Whereas the Canadian data show only the highest level of education attained (differentiating between no degree, certificate or diploma; high school graduate; high school graduate with some post-secondary education; post secondary certificate or diploma and university degree), in Germany we analysed vocational qualifications (differentiating between no vocational qualification; apprenticeship/training; university degree; other qualifications). The figures are, however, precise enough to show some fundamental tendencies.

26.8.* They are the people chiefly responsible for lowering the average age of an otherwise aging population.

Despite these figures, immigrants living in Germany still have a higher average age – 43.8 – than the native German population. This is mainly because the number of children immigrating to Germany themselves is relatively small, meaning that the younger cohorts are underrepresented.¹⁰²

When looking at educational attainment of immigrants both to Canada and to Germany, we find that they are more likely to have completed tertiary education than the native population. In 2010, the share of graduates among native Germans over the age of 15 was 14.5 percent, while among immigrants it was 15 percent.¹⁰³ In Canada the figures are much more skewed in favour of immigrants: in 2010, 30.6 percent of all immigrants over the age of 15 had completed tertiary education, while the figure for Canadians was 20.9 percent.¹⁰⁴

In both countries, moreover, the average educational level of recent immigrants is much higher than that of the immigrant


population as a whole. In Germany, 33.9 percent of all immigrants who had arrived in the last five years were graduates, while in Canada the figure was as high as 44.7 percent.¹⁰⁵ The figures differed considerably, however, according to country of origin. For Germany, the share of graduates among people from non-EU countries was 30.5 percent, much lower than that for EU immigrants, of whom 45.2 percent had completed tertiary education.¹⁰⁶

A special factor in Germany is the widespread dual education system, which provides for both an academic and non-academic track. More than half of all native Germans over the age of 15 have a vocational qualification as their highest qualification, while a quarter have no vocational qualification at all. The situation is far worse among immigrants: just under a third of them have completed an apprenticeship or vocational training and an alarming 48.3 percent have no qualification at all. This is particularly often the case for immigrants from non-EU states.¹⁰⁹


New immigrants well qualified

Immigrants in both Germany and Canada are more likely to have completed tertiary education than the native population – particularly those who have arrived recently. In Canada in 2010, around 45 percent of people who had arrived since 2006 were university graduates. A further 20 percent had a post-secondary certificate or diploma. In Germany the share of highly-qualified persons is somewhat lower, and unlike in Canada many immigrants are low qualified or unqualified.

Germany



Canada



Educational or vocational qualifications held by natives and immigrants over the age of 14 in Germany (2010) and Canada (2010)

(Data source: own calculations based on data from the Statistisches Bundesamt¹⁰⁷; Statistics Canada¹⁰⁸)

The analysis shows that many immigrants in Germany are at one of the extreme ends of the qualifications scale – in other words, they either have no vocational qualification at all or they have tertiary education. The share of low-qualified persons seems to be particularly high in managed migration, i.e. from non-EU states. This is a consequence of the “guest workers” policy of the 1950s–1970s, when Germany mainly recruited a workforce with little education. With respect to the educational attainment of immigrants this policy had a doubly negative impact, since the family members who came to join the guest workers from the 1970s to the 1990s were predominantly low-qualified persons. By contrast, migration within the EU and the increasingly selective immigration policy of recent years towards non-EU foreigners has, despite widespread views to the contrary, brought many well-qualified people to Germany.

Labour market deficits

An important indicator for measuring the economic integration of immigrants is the employment rate – in other words, the share of working population as a percentage of the total population of working age. Since for Canada we only have data available concerning the employment rate of 25- to 54-year-olds, we will also focus on this age group in our analysis of the situation in Germany.

Common to both countries is that despite their higher educational attainment immigrants are less likely to be employed than the native population. The difference is, however, much greater in Germany. Whereas in Germany 83.8 percent of native Germans between 25 and 54 were employed in 2010, this applied to only 69.7 percent of immigrants.¹¹⁰ At the same point in time, the employment rate for Canadians

was 82.4 percent – roughly the same level as Germany – but that of immigrants, at 75.2 percent, was significantly higher.¹¹¹ One interesting statistic in Canada is that whereas for men the employment rates for immigrants and Canadians are comparable, immigrant women lag behind Canadian women in this respect.¹¹² In Germany, on the other hand, there is a clear discrepancy between immigrants and natives for both sexes.¹¹³

Another important finding is that particularly in the early years after arriving immigrants have difficulty establishing themselves in the labour market. Among those who immigrated to Germany between 2006 and 2010, only 57.9 percent were employed¹¹⁴ – more than 11 percentage points lower than the average


for all immigrants. Again it is the immigrants from non-EU states who are most affected, with an employment rate of 52.8 percent. The picture is the same in Canada. There, 63.5 percent of immigrants who have arrived in the last five years are employed – 12 percentage points below the average for all immigrants.¹¹⁵

The situation of immigrant graduates is particularly interesting. At 75.5 percent they have the highest employment rate of all immigrant groups in Germany. At the same time, they lag far behind native German graduates, 92.7 percent of whom are employed. The worst score is for immigrant graduates from non-EU states who have arrived in the last five years, only 56.7

Immigrants less likely to be employed

Both in Germany and in Canada the employment rate for immigrants is lower than that for the native population. Particularly those who have arrived only recently often have difficulty finding a job. The gap between new arrivals and natives is greater in Germany than in Canada, and would be greater still if immigrants from other EU states did not push up the average of all immigrants.

Percent



percent of whom are employed.¹¹⁸ The pattern is similar in Canada, but once again the difference between immigrants and natives is smaller. The employment rate for Canadian graduates is 89.9 percent, whereas for immigrants it is 78.3 percent.¹¹⁹ The fact that immigrants in Canada are more likely to be employed than those in Germany can hence only partially be attributed to the fact that Canada generally tends to attract better qualified immigrants. For even when their qualifications are on a par with those of Canadians they are more likely to find a job than those in Germany.


The situation with respect to unemployment is similar. In 2010, 5 percent of persons between the ages of 25 and 54 born in Germany were unemployed, but 9 percent of immigrants. In Canada, the corresponding figures were 6.1 and 9.5 percent, respectively.¹²² Unemployment decreases with increasing levels of education, but the gap between natives and immigrants becomes larger. Thus, while immigrant graduates at 6.6 percent have the lowest unemployment rate of all immigrants, they are three times as likely to be unemployed as native graduates (1.9 percent). The differences were much smaller among persons with a vocational qualification (8.6 versus 5.6 percent) and among persons without any vocational qualification (10.8 versus 10 percent).¹²³

Immigrants earn less

Alongside employment, salary is also an important indicator of labour market integration. Since this obviously does not include those who are not employed, salary allows us to take a closer look at the situation of immigrants who have found a job in their country of destination. Because the data available vary between the two countries, we have used the gross hourly wage as the basis for our analysis of Canada,

Highly-qualified persons at a disadvantage

Both in Germany and in Canada immigrants at all levels of education are less likely to be employed than natives. In Germany, however, the gap is much greater. In neither country can immigrant graduates compete with the very high employment rates of native graduates.



Employment rates of 25- to 54-year-olds by educational attainment in Canada and Germany, 2010
(Data sources: own calculations based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt¹²⁰; Statistics Canada¹²¹)

whereas for Germany only an approximate net hourly wage can be calculated on the basis of the micro-census data.* The data are therefore only comparable to a certain extent.


Once again we see that immigrants in both countries do worse than natives. Whereas the average wage for native Germans in 2010 was 11.71 euros, immigrants earned only 10.68 euros. In Canada the gross hourly wage for Canadians in 2008 was 23.72 Canadian dollars, that of immigrants only 21.44 dollars.¹²⁴

* The basis for calculating the approximate net hourly wage is the net monthly wage, for which the respondents to the micro-census were asked to choose one of 24 categories, ranging from "under 150 euros" to "18,000 euros and more". In order to calculate the average, we attributed to every person in a particular income bracket the average of this as monthly income. We excluded the 24th category, which does not have a ceiling. Since monthly income can come from many different sources (e.g., state transfer payments, income from capital investments or bonuses), we only looked at those people who gave employment earnings as their main source of income. In order to make the German data as comparable as possible with the Canadian data, we only looked at the group of 25- to 54-year-olds, excluded all self-employed people and only analysed those who provided a positive response to the question about monthly income. In a second step, we divided the monthly income by the average number of hours worked per month.

Salary depends on country of origin

Immigrants in Germany earn on average one euro per hour less than native Germans. While graduates earn more than other immigrants, they still earn 1.64 euros, or 10 percent less than native German graduates. In addition, their earnings vary considerably according to country of origin. Graduates who took advantage of the EU's freedom of labour policy to work in Germany between 2006 and 2010 and who were still living in Germany in 2010 earned roughly 20 percent more – 16.38 euros an hour – than graduates from non-EU states, who earned only 13.67 euros. The European migration elite are thus in an even better position than native German graduates.

Net hourly wage in Germany in euros, 2010
(Own calculations based on data from the Statistisches Bundesamt¹²⁵)



Immigrants with tertiary education again do better than other immigrants, but lag further behind natives with the same level of qualification than other immigrant groups do. Whereas the difference in Germany was around 10 percent, in Canada the gap was as large as 17 percent.¹²⁶ Part of this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the figures for Canada were based on gross salaries. In view of the progressive taxation system under which higher earners have to pay more tax, the differences in net salary are probably lower.

In Canada we see once again that recently arrived immigrants do especially badly. In 2008, they earned on average more than five Canadian dollars less than Canadians did.¹²⁷ In Germany, by contrast, immigrants who have arrived in the last five years do better than other immigrants. In 2010, they earned on average 11.47 euros and hence almost as much as native Germans. This can be explained by the fact that the share of highly-qualified persons, who push up the average

salary, was particularly large between 2006 and 2010 – especially among EU immigrants, who in Germany actually earn significantly more than German graduates. How big the discrepancy is between EU graduates and non-EU graduates is illustrated by their respective average hourly wage. In 2010, this was 16.38 euros for EU immigrants and 13.67 euros for non-EU immigrants.¹²⁸

Few opportunities for advancement for second-generation immigrants in Germany

The analysis showed that there are still considerable differences between native Germans and immigrants with respect to level of education and success on the labour market. In particular, immigrants from non-EU states – the main group in which this study is interested – achieve below average outcomes on both these scores in Germany. But what is the situation like for the children of immigrants? Do they do better than their parents? Or do socio-economic differences become consolidated in the second generation of immigrants?

We define second-generation immigrants as people whose parents have both come to the present territory of Germany either as foreigners or as *Aussiedler* (repatriating ethnic Germans), but who were themselves born in Germany. The second-generation immigrants in our random sample were on average 11.1 years old and hence much younger than the average age for the population as a whole.¹²⁹ In order to avoid too great a distortion with respect to employment and especially with respect to salaries, we will look only at the relatively small group of 25- to 34-year-olds.

The vocational qualifications obtained by second-generation immigrants are closer to those of their parents than to those of their German peers. In 2010, 39.6 percent of them had no vocational qualification at all, and only 10.7 percent had tertiary education. Among native Germans the figures for the same age group were 16.2 and 21.7 percent, respectively.¹³⁰ More interesting than the absolute figures, however, is the extent to

which immigrant and native German children manage to attain a better qualification than their parents. Since parents were only asked about their vocational qualification in a voluntary random sub-sample comprising 10 percent of the original sample in the micro-census of 2009, the number of cases available for the analysis was relatively small and reveals only rough tendencies.*

Of the 25- to 34-year-olds, both of whose parents did not have tertiary education, 15.5 percent in 2009 were graduates. The children of parents both of whom were born in Germany had the highest chance of advancement, 16.1 percent. Of the 43 children observed in the sub-sample with two immigrant parents without tertiary education, not one managed to obtain a degree. If at least one parent was born abroad, the figure was 3.4 percent.¹³¹ Doubtless, these figures cannot provide any precise diagnosis, but they lead one to suspect that upward social mobility is more difficult for the children of immigrants than for those of native German parents. Analyses by other authors measuring, for example, the income levels of parents and their children, yielded similar findings.¹³²

* The random sub-sample was an ad-hoc module that in the framework of the 2009 EU Labour Force Survey was devoted to the “transition of young people into the labour market” and was specifically addressed to 15- to 34-year-olds.

In Canada children of immigrants form the educational elite

The situation in Canada is completely different. There, the children of immigrants have a significantly higher level of education than Canadians.¹³³ The higher level of education achieved by their parents can only partly explain this phenomenon.¹³⁴ In fact, immigrant children perform better in the Canadian education system than children whose parents were born in Canada, irrespective of their parents' educational attainment. Some figures illustrate this: in 2009, almost a third (30 percent) of all 25- to 39-year-olds from non-graduate households with at least one immigrant parent had completed tertiary education – among children of non-immigrant parents the figure was only 21 percent.¹³⁵ Compared with Germany, two things stand out: first of all, there generally seems to be a greater degree of social mobility in Canada than in Germany; secondly, this applies especially to second-generation immigrants.


Their educational advantage also helps immigrant children on the Canadian labour market, where they are on average less likely to be unemployed and more likely to earn higher salaries than the children of Canadians. Where educational attainment is the same, however, the children of immigrants earn less than the others. Above all, members of so-called visible minorities – in other words, most non-European immigrants – are at a disadvantage here. In fact, most of these people, who make up the group of “new” immigrants since the 1960s, earn on average less than Canadians who do not belong to a visible minority, despite their educational advantage. Nevertheless, the gap between them and the children of Canadians is smaller than it was in their parents' generation.¹³⁶ This indicates that Canada manages to bring even those immigrants who initially do worst on the labour market, such as Africans and many Asians, up to the level of Canadians across generations.

In Germany, by contrast, the children of immigrants are much less likely to be employed and are more often unemployed than others. Whereas in 2010, 25- to 34-year-olds both of whose parents were born in Germany had an employment rate of 81 percent, this applied to only 65.1 percent of persons with two immigrant parents and to 65 percent of those with one immigrant parent. In addition, 12.6 percent of the children of immigrant parents observed were unemployed in 2010, while only 5.8 percent of the children of those born in Germany were.¹³⁷

Catching up – and overtaking?

Whereas the second generation of immigrants to Germany have a smaller chance of upward social mobility via education than those with German parents, the children of immigrants to Canada have no problem out-performing their Canadian peers. A third of all children with immigrant non-graduate parents manage to obtain tertiary education there. The much smaller degree of social mobility in Germany can only partially be explained by the fact that people with a vocational qualification also have a good chance of getting a job.

- At least one immigrant parent
- No immigrant parent



5

THE CANADIAN SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

Canada attracts more immigrants than Germany – both relative to its total population and in absolute terms. The share of economic immigrants among all immigrants is also higher than in Germany. In addition, Canada manages to achieve a

higher level of educational attainment among its immigrants, which in turn has a positive effect on their integration in the labour market. And finally, unlike in Germany, the children of immigrants obtain higher educational qualifications than the children of Canadians.

What are the reasons for all this? And why do immigrants in Canada nonetheless still have greater problems in the labour market than Canadians? The answers to these questions can provide valuable insights into which aspects of Canada's immigration and integration policy might also be of interest to Germany.

Canada is ahead

Canada's advantage over Germany with respect to various aspects of immigration, in percent (Own calculations based on data from Statistics Canada, Statistisches Bundesamt, Mikrozensus 2010)

Annual migration surplus per 1,000 inhabitants, mean value 2007–2011

Percentage share of graduates among 25- to 34-year-olds (for Canada 25- to 39-year-olds) with at least one immigrant parent, 2010 (Canada 2009)

Share of economic immigrants as a percentage of all immigrants, 2010

Share of graduates as a percentage of all immigrants (in Germany, from non-EU states), 2006 to 2010

Employment rate of immigrants aged 25 to 54, 2010



5.1

THE SELECTION OF IMMIGRANTS

For a number of decades now Canada has actively been recruiting highly qualified and skilled workers and has one of the world's highest migration surpluses. Germany, by contrast, is only slowly beginning to realize that immigrant labour is unavoidable if our level of prosperity is to continue to rise in the future. Yet there is little clarity about how immigration policy in Germany should be organised in practice.

In order to be able to assess various possible measures, it is first important to classify the various steering mechanisms. For a comparison between Canada and Germany it would seem to make sense to distinguish between human capital-oriented and labour market-oriented models. In the first instance, immigrants are selected on the basis of abilities that in the long term will enable them to make as large a contribution as possible to the economy of the host country. In practice such immigrants are usually highly qualified persons who fit the requirements of a modern knowledge economy and who are expected to be able to deal easily with living in a foreign society. In the second instance, the focus is more on alleviating short-term

labour shortages. Immigrants recruited for this purpose therefore generally need to have a concrete job offer to enter the country.

One of the strengths of human capital-oriented models is that by using a points system they allow the immigration of people with very particular abilities and potential. A further advantage is that they are easy for would-be immigrants to understand and for the same reason are accepted by the native population. Since the evaluation criteria are clearly defined, points systems are highly transparent, so that countries using points systems send a signal of openness to the outside world.

There are, however, a number of disadvantages too. Points systems generate a lot of bureaucracy, for example checking applications. Depending on the arrangements in place, integrating immigrants may temporarily involve costs for the host society. These costs continue to rise the longer the new arrivals remain unemployed. In addition, there is a danger that immigrants will not settle where they are most needed from an economic point of view.

Canada's points system, which enables immigrants to enter the country largely irrespective of whether they have a concrete job offer, is regarded internationally as a pioneering achievement in human capital-oriented immigration. In Germany, by contrast, the immigration of people from non-EU countries is normally contingent on their having a job offer and is hence categorized as labour market-oriented immigration. Since this type of immigration leads directly to employment, the short-term integration costs are likely to be lower. In addition, labour market tests can ensure that immigration does not produce undesirable side-effects on the labour market, such as squeezing out native workers through the excessive depression of wages. And finally, labour market-oriented immigration models can respond more quickly to short-term labour shortages – outside as well as within the highly qualified sector.

The main disadvantage of labour market-oriented models is that they make economic migration more difficult because would-be immigrants have to look for a job in their country of destination while still living in their home country. Without networks, contacts and knowledge of the labour market this is often well nigh impossible. What is more, there is a danger that immigrants will be exploited by their employer because in some cases their residence is contingent on their employment.¹⁴⁰

Deterioration of integration in Canada in the 1980s

In 1967, the Canadian government launched the Federal Skilled Worker Program, which even today remains the centrepiece of its immigration policy. Using a points system it selects a certain number of people each year to whom it grants permanent residence together with their families.

In the early years of the points system integration functioned relatively smoothly. New arrivals in all immigration categories quickly found a job and their earnings were on a par with those of Canadian-born people. Thus, men who immigrated to Canada in the second half of the 1970s earned salaries in the first five years of their residence that were roughly 90 percent of those earned by the Canadian-born population. After 11 to 15 years their earnings reached the level of the Canadian-born and after at least 20 years they even overtook them. A similar pattern was observable for immigrant women.¹⁴¹

In the 1980s, however, the economic situation of immigrants began to deteriorate. In the first five years of residence immigrant men earned almost 30 percent less on average than Canadian-born people.¹⁴² In the 1990s this trend continued, so that new arrivals in the year 2000 earned around 13 percent less than those who came in 1980, while the income of those born in Canada rose by 10 percent over the same period.¹⁴³ Particularly at the lower end of the salary scale the discrepancy became particularly large. Whereas 24.6 percent of new arrivals in 1980 were categorised as low earners, by

The strengths and weaknesses of the two models

Human capital-oriented immigration focuses on the long-term successful integration of immigrants. Here immigrants are selected on the basis of their general abilities and knowledge irrespective of whether they have a job offer. These models, however, involve a lot of bureaucracy and often give rise to short-term costs if new arrivals do not find a job immediately. Labour market-oriented immigration models avoid short-term costs, since they are contingent on immigrants already having a job offer when they enter the country. Problems can emerge if immigrants lose their jobs. What is more, such models tend to attract fewer immigrants, since without contacts or networks in the country of destination it is often very difficult to find a job.

Human capital-oriented immigration

Advantages

- Precise steering of immigration
- Transparency
- Sends signal of openness to the outside world

Disadvantages

- High level of bureaucracy
- Additional integration costs in the short term
- Workers may not settle where they are needed

Labour market-oriented immigration

Advantages

- Swift integration in the labour market
- Effective in counteracting short-term labour shortages

Disadvantages

- Difficult to find a job from abroad
- Risk of long-term costs in the event of job loss
- Possible dependence on employer

(Own chart)

2000 the figure had risen to 35.8 percent. At the same time, the rate among Canadian-born people fell. The danger of sliding into low income brackets, especially in the first year, was, at 35 to 45 percent, very high. For many immigrants this situation persisted for several years, and was hence by no means a temporary state of affairs.¹⁴⁴

Although immigrants selected on the basis of the points system did considerably better than others, the poor economic situation of those settling in the country was nevertheless one reason why the Canadian government decided in 1986 and then again in 1993 to revise the points allocation in the Federal Skilled Worker Program.¹⁴⁵ They allocated

more points for general abilities such as education or language skills and fewer for specific vocational qualifications. They also raised the percentage of economic immigrants as a share of all immigrants. Thus, for the first time this “new look” system became clearly oriented towards the human capital brought by the new arrivals.

The reforms achieved only part of their intended effect, however. Although in 2000 a quarter of all new arrivals had a university degree – in 1980 the figure had been only 6 percent – the incomes of immigrants lagged way behind those of the Canadian-born part of the population.¹⁴⁶ The situation was only slightly better with respect to the employment rate. Even though it also fell among immigrants until the mid-1990s, the differences between immigrants and those

born in Canada were never as large as they were with respect to income.¹⁴⁷ This suggests that many new arrivals found a job in Canada but not one that corresponded with their qualifications, or rather not one that earned them a salary commensurate with their abilities.

Despite these deteriorating figures, the points system was not a complete failure: studies of immigrants conducted in 2000 and 2001 show that those who had scored a high number of points were also more successful at integrating. Thus income rose by 2 percent on average for every extra point, while the likelihood of being employed rose by half of one percent. Applicants at the upper end of the scale – in other words, those with at least 70 points – benefited disproportionately from each extra point.¹⁴⁸


Skills acquired abroad of little value

But how can the deterioration in integration be explained? The first point to be mentioned is that in the 1980s and early 1990s, more and more people came to Canada from non-European countries. They often spoke little English or French, which made their integration much more difficult,¹⁵⁰ aggravated by discrimination on the part of the host society. Furthermore, a trend was first observed in the 1980s for Canadian employers to attach less and less value to work experience gained abroad. This trend has continued and has meanwhile led to a situation where immigrants with 20 years work experience abroad scarcely earn more than those with no experience. The allocation of a large number of points for specific occupational groups also proved to be counter-productive. In the 1990s this policy led to the widespread immigration of IT professionals, who then immediately became unemployed when the New Economy collapsed.¹⁵¹

Immigrants fall behind

Whereas in the 1970s immigrants’ earnings were already close to those of the Canadian-born people shortly after their arrival and after 20 years at most they managed to catch up, new immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s fell further and further behind. In the mid-1990s even those with the same level of education earned 40 percent less shortly after arriving in Canada. Whether they will be able to close this gap over time is as yet unclear.

Income ratio between immigrants and Canadian-born people



Income ratio* between full-time year-round employed immigrants between 16 and 64 and Canadian-born people with the same characteristics (education, experience, ethnic group, province, family status) in Canada according to period of immigration, Canadians = 1
(Data source: Frenette, M. & Morissette, R., 2003¹⁴⁹)

* The analysis was based on logarithms of incomes. The differences are roughly on a par with percentage differences.

	1967	1978	1986	1993	2002	2013
Education	20	12	12	15	25	25
Language	10	10	15	14	24	28
Occupational demand	15	15	10	10	—	—
Type of profession	10	15	15	17	—	—
Work experience	—	8	8	8	21	15
Age	10	10	10	10	10	12
Personal suitability (subjective assessment)	15	10	10	10	—	—
Demographic factor	—	—	10	8	—	—
Job offer	10	10	10	10	10	10
Ability to integrate	—	—	—	—	10	10
Relative as sponsor	5	5	—	—	—	—
Destination region	5	5	—	—	—	—
Pass mark	50	50	70	67	75 (from 2003: 67)	67

Flexible points system

Over the years the Canadian government has revised its points system several times. The reforms have turned the program into a human capital system, which selects immigrants on the basis of their general abilities and experience. Thus the government no longer allocates points to specific occupational groups. The human capital model in its pure form, however, existed only until 2008, when the government made the points evaluation subject to an overriding general restriction. In the meantime the only people who can apply must fulfill one of three conditions: they should either be qualified in one of 24 sought-after occupations or have a job offer in Canada or have obtained a doctorate at a Canadian university.

Maximum possible number of points per category and pass mark in the Canadian points system, 1967 to 2013

(Data source: Green, A. & Green, D., 2004¹⁵²; Citizenship and Immigration Canada)

One reason often cited for the deterioration in immigrants' situation on the labour market is that Canadian employers are becoming increasingly critical of their educational qualifications. This is not actually the case, though, for immigrants with the same qualifications have always earned less in Canada than Canadian-born people. Little happened to change that situation in the 1980s.¹⁵³

So why do immigrants earn less even when they have the same education? Two possible answers spring to mind: either Canadian employers discriminate against them, or their

educational qualifications really are inferior, so that their formal qualifications do not adequately reflect their real ability to perform. To find out which of these two explanations applies, researchers subjected Canadian-born people and immigrants to tests aimed at gauging their general abilities and knowledge directly. The tests showed that immigrants' performance was inferior even when they had the same level of education as Canadian-born people. What is more, controlling for test results, the immigrants did not in fact earn less than those born in Canada.¹⁵⁴ All of this suggests that foreign educational qualifications often do not meet Canadian standards. Neverthe-

less, a residue of doubt remains: the fact that the immigrants scored worse on the tests may be because of language difficulties which did not allow them to demonstrate their full abilities. This is supported by the fact that the salaries of immigrants and Canadian-born people with the same linguistic ability and the same level of education are roughly on a par.¹⁵⁵

Successful switch to pure human-capital steering

With the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2002 the Canadian government tried to solve some of the problems contributing to the poor labour market data for immigrants. Following the collapse of the IT sector it eliminated any kind of allocation of points to particular occupational groups. The points freed up in this way were used to give a much stronger weighting to language skills, and the educational criterion was made even more rigorous.

Having given the points system a human capital-oriented look in the 1980s and 1990s, it now created a purely human capital system. The effects of the reform were mainly positive. In particular the greater value attached to language skills and educational qualifications had a clearly measurable effect on integration success.¹⁵⁶ Researchers discovered this by exploiting the fact that in the first few years after the law came into force some immigrants were still being selected according to the old regulations whereas others were already being subjected to the new criteria. Thus new arrivals who were subject to the new arrangements earned an average of 40,000 Canadian dollars a year in 2005, while those who had come to Canada under the old rules earned only 24,000 dollars. In 2005, moreover, 80 percent of the immigrants selected according to the new criteria reported one year after their arrival in Canada that they were either employed or self-employed.¹⁵⁷

Attributing the deteriorating situation of immigrants at the turn of the millennium to the human capital-oriented system was thus wrong, for until 2005 immigrants were still being selected almost exclusively according to the old regulations.¹⁵⁸ While it is still too early to judge the success of the reforms in the long term, the dangers of the points

system in any case mainly relate to the initial period after immigrants enter the country. Canada's experience from the 1990s illustrates this: those immigrants who managed to avoid un- and underemployment in their first year of residence continued to have much better chances of success than others later on.¹⁵⁹

The experience of the last ten years has shown that a precise allocation of points is an important key to success. In order to better deal with the weaknesses of the system described above, the Canadian government once again changed the points allocation system in 2013. Even more weight was given to language skills, which have a proven positive effect on integration success. An important point here is that immigrants should have a good command of the language; slight knowledge is usually insufficient for the Canadian labour market.¹⁶⁰ This is a significant change, given that previously applicants with low competence in Canada's two national languages were able to score


just as many points as those with a good knowledge of just one of those languages.¹⁶¹ In addition, the government has introduced extra points for work experience in Canada. In doing this it is paying heed to the fact that experience of working in other countries did not raise the chances of integration success in the past. In practice this means that people who are already in Canada as temporary labour migrants will have a better chance of attaining permanent residency via the points system.

Recent findings, not only from Canada, indicate that younger applicants on average do better on the labour market than those who are older.¹⁶³ The points allocation according to age was therefore also adjusted, which should also have a positive demographic effect, for so far the extent to which immigration to Canada has helped to push the age structure of the population down has been limited.¹⁶⁴ Other changes included a reduction in the maximum number of points scorable for work experience.

Human capital pays

Even after the human capital model was introduced in 2002, there was still a large backlog of applications to be evaluated using the old criteria. This makes it easy to illustrate the success of the new points allocation system. Immigrants who had been selected according to the new criteria earned on average 58 percent more than others in their first year of residence. In the years that followed, too, the difference did not become significantly smaller. As well as earning more, the "new" immigrants also have much higher employment rates.

Canadian dollars



Bureaucracy impedes efficient functioning of the points system

An unintended side-effect of the human capital system was that the mountain of unprocessed applications grew steadily. Particularly after the government reduced the minimum number of points required to pass in 2003 from 75 to 67, the number of applications received grew considerably. The average time required to process an application thus rose to 23 months – some applicants even had to wait as long as six years for an answer.¹⁶⁵ Checking the information on language skills, level of education and work experience in particular proved to be immensely time-consuming.¹⁶⁶

Thus one theoretical weakness of the points system, namely the huge administrative effort required, has also been illustrated by the Canadian model in practice. Obviously delays of this kind lead us to question how well the system functions: they put off potential applicants and place drastic limits on the flexibility of the system. For if applications already received still need to be evaluated according to old criteria even years after a reform, then short-term adjustments will fail to have their intended effect.

The large number of unprocessed applications led the Canadian government in 2008 to partially abandon human-capital steering and instead to make a list of especially sought-after occupations. Persons who were not qualified in any of the 24 occupations classified as being particularly in demand can only participate in the points system if they either have a job offer or if they have obtained a doctorate at a Canadian university. This poses the danger that the points system will be robbed of its greatest strength, namely, the selection of immigrants according to their long-term potential.

Canada usually covers its short-term needs via other programs, such as the Temporary Foreign Worker Program or the Provincial Nominee Program.

Selection criteria in the Canadian points system in 2013

Criterion	Maximum no. of points	No. of points
Education	25	
PhD		25
Master's degree		23
Other post-secondary degrees		15–22
High school		5
Language skills	28	
First language (English/French)		24
Second language (English/French)		4
Work experience	15	
1 year		9
2–3 years		11
4–5 years		13
6 or more years		15
Age	12	
Under 18		0
18–35		12
36		11
37		10
...		...
46		1
47 and older		0
Employment	10	
Confirmed job offer		10
Already working in Canada		10
Ability to integrate	10	
Language skills of partner		5
Past study in Canada		5
Partner's past study in Canada		5
Past work in Canada		10
Partner's past work in Canada		5
Arranged employment in Canada		5
Relatives in Canada		5
Pass mark		67

(Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada)

Another problem of the new system is to reliably identify shortfalls on the labour market and to translate these into policy quickly. By the 1990s many immigrants from allegedly sought-after occupations came to realise only after their arrival in Canada that their skills were no longer required.¹⁶⁷ Even the main aim of the reforms – to reduce the amount of bureaucracy by reducing the number of applications – was only achieved up to a point. Although the number of unprocessed applications has fallen considerably since 2007, there are still 300,000 applicants who have been waiting more than four-and-a-half years for an answer from Canada.¹⁶⁸ The government is now sending all these “old” applications back unprocessed.¹⁶⁹

The growing significance of labour-market orientation in the points system


Despite all the reforms, one element of labour-market orientation has survived to this day in the points system: the extra points awarded for an existing job offer. Indeed, those immigrants who come to Canada via the points system with a job offer earn 74 percent more on average than others in their first year. Hardly surprising, given that other immigrants otherwise spend their first few months in Canada looking for a job or take on badly paid work as a stop-gap solution. With each further year that immigrants spend in Canada, the income difference between those with and without an initial job offer decreases by around 9 percent.¹⁷⁰

In recent years immigration based on an existing job offer has increased, not least because alongside the list of occupations in demand or obtaining a doctorate in Canada this is now the only way that would-be immigrants can participate in the points system at all. This apparently attractive situation does not bring only advantages,

however. Recently officials at Canadian government agencies have repeatedly complained of instances of fraud in providing proof of a job offer. The Canadian visa authority in Hong Kong, for example, issued a positive Arranged Employment Opinion in only 24 percent of cases in 2008. The Arranged Employment Opinion confirms that a job offer is authentic and that the immigrant in question is being employed under conditions customary for the sector. In the early 2000s the same authority had issued a positive opinion in more than 90 percent of cases.¹⁷¹

No answer after four years

A major problem of the Canadian points system is the bureaucracy it involves. The Canadian government tried to alleviate the situation in 2008 by introducing reforms that considerably restricted immigration via the points system, but this was only partially successful. Whereas the backlog of new applications was reduced immediately, those applications that had been received before the reforms were still not processed. As a result, the government decided to send these “old” applications back unprocessed.



Whether it makes sense to award extra points for an existing job offer is therefore a matter of opinion. Is the extra work needed to verify such an offer really worth what it costs? This depends partly on the extent to which the immigrants’ short-term success is at the expense of their more long-term prospects. Unfortunately, there are currently no detailed studies available on this issue. Mixing human capital-oriented and labour market-oriented components has undoubtedly deprived the system of clarity.

Significance of labour-market orientation growing outside the points system too

One channel for immigration to Canada that is becoming ever more important is the Provincial Nominee Programs, which allows the provinces to select immigrants according to their own criteria. Over the past decade these programs have experienced a rapid boom. One of the reasons for this is the federal points system. For the overwhelming majority of immigrants selected via the Federal Skilled Worker Program have settled in the cities of the central Province of Ontario, while other provinces, despite their demand for labour, have not received enough immigrants. Take Alberta, for instance, with its booming oil industry. Now, however, the Provincial Nominees account for 25 percent of all economic immigrants – in 2002 the figure was still only 2 percent.¹⁷³

Every Canadian province now has a Provincial Nominee Program, which offers various channels for permanent immigration, mainly for highly and medium qualified workers. Many provinces also offer programs for potential investors, international students or family members. In 2011, Citizenship and Immigration Canada could list more than 50 different opportunities to immigrate to Canada under the Provincial Nominee Programs.¹⁷⁴

Given the huge variety of programs it is almost impossible to evaluate them according to a single standard. Even just the programs for qualified workers are so diverse that it is impossible to compare them. Although most provinces make a job offer a precondition, some provinces also regulate immigration using a list of the most sought-after occupations. Others, moreover, require would-be immigrants to have already spent some time in Canada as Temporary Foreign Workers.¹⁷⁵ Provincial Nominee Programs hence primarily regulate access to permanent residency rather than entry to Canada.

Provincial Nominee Programs cannot be classified 100 percent as labour-market oriented instruments, but they have certainly pushed Canadian immigration policy much more strongly in this direction over the past 15 years. They often aim to alleviate labour shortages in certain occupations not served by the points system, for example in the trades sector. The stronger focus on workers who have completed vocational training instead of university education is also illustrated by the profile of immigrants in these programs by comparison with the points system. Thus 85 percent of the Federal Skilled Workers who arrived between 2005 and 2009 had a Bachelor's, Master's or doctoral degree, compared with only 51 percent of the Provincial Nominees.¹⁷⁶

Since many Provincial Nominees attain their residence status via a job offer, they are usually pretty successful in the labour market in the early years. After one year in Canada more than 90 percent of them earn an income from employment or self-employment – among the Federal Skilled Workers this applies to only 81 to 86 percent. Five years after receiving permanent residency, the difference is smaller, but still exists. The situation is different regarding income levels. Here immigrants who have come to Canada via the points system overtake the Provincial Nominees after about

Immigration and the brain drain

Immigration of highly qualified workers has consequences not only for countries of destination but also for countries of origin. Particularly in developing countries this poses the danger of a brain drain – i.e. the emigration of the few well-qualified skilled workers that they have. Efforts made by these countries to enable some young people to study would thus be wasted. This would not only stymie economic development but is also at odds with international development cooperation. Canada accepts this problem and makes a clear division between immigration and development cooperation policy. But is there actually a more sensible way to combine these two policy areas?

One simple solution would be to actively encourage immigrants who have acquired additional knowledge in their temporary new homes to return home. This is, however, not compatible with the goal of attracting immigrants as long-term workers and fellow citizens. In addition, exchange programs of this kind would mean that there would be a steady stream of new immigrants to be integrated and inducted into employment in Canada. Yet even if immigrants do not return, they can still help their countries of origin by sending money home to relatives and friends. In fact, in global terms the remittances by immigrants to their countries of origin greatly exceed international development aid funds. What is more, a certain proportion of immigrants return home anyway after a time, bringing not only money but also know-how and business connections. In this way returning immigrants have managed to build up whole companies, for example in the burgeoning Indian software industry.

The emigration of highly qualified people from poor countries could only be stopped if developed countries agreed to forego or prohibit immigration from certain countries. Already today the World Health Organization has a list of countries where there is a shortage of skilled medical personnel such as doctors and nurses to run the health service. Were the existing personnel to be recruited to work abroad, this would lead to a marked deterioration in health provision. As with many other international agreements, however, the options for imposing sanctions for breaches are extremely limited. It would make more sense if the recipient countries were to pay compensation or some other form of recompense – such as financing training programs or establishing universities – in return for benefiting from immigration by particular occupational groups.

three years.¹⁷⁷ Unfortunately, there are no long-term figures available for employment and income levels, since many Provincial Nominee Programs were only created in the last ten years. Such a comparison would, however, provide valuable insights, since Federal Skilled Workers, unlike many Provincial Nominees, are chosen primarily on the basis of their potential to adapt to life in Canada in the long term.

With respect to the question of whether immigrants simply take any job or succeed in finding one commensurate with their qualifications, the Provincial Nominee Programs and the points system show similar results. 70 percent of all Provincial Nominees and 72 percent of the Federal Skilled Workers

answer this question positively.¹⁷⁸ The slightly lower value for immigrants selected by the provinces can be explained by the fact that not only qualified workers come to the provinces but also entrepreneurs and family members who often score worse results in the first years. Generally the experience of the Provincial Nominee Programs shows that integration is much more successful if immigrants have already lived in Canada as students or temporary migrants prior to their nomination and have thus had the chance to build up a personal network.¹⁷⁹

Federal Skilled Workers catch up

Immigrants selected via the points system are much less likely to be employed and earn less in their first year than is the case for Provincial Nominees. This is primarily because the latter often obtain their residence permit via an existing job offer. The longer immigrants have been in Canada, however, the more the figures for the two groups converge. In terms of income the Federal Skilled Workers even manage to overtake the Provincial Nominees after around three years. The more long-term orientation of the points system thus pays off.


But do Provincial Nominee Programs fulfill the purpose for which they were designed, namely, to distribute immigrants more evenly across Canada? The answer is definitely “yes”, for whereas 86 percent of all immigrants entering Canada via the points system go to Ontario or British Columbia, this applies to only 22 percent of Provincial Nominees. The “Prairie” Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta received 65 percent of all Provincial Nominees.

In most cases the Nominees stay in the province for which they were nominated: in 2008 this applied to 82 percent of all immigrants nominated between 2000 and 2008.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, these figures conceal major regional differences. Whereas between 83 and 96 percent of immigrants in the large Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba stay in the region on account of the favourable labour market, in the Atlantic Provinces – Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador – less than half do so.¹⁸²

What can Germany learn?

As in many other countries, the trend in Canadian immigration policy is towards a hybrid system, which combines elements of human-capital orientation with elements of labour-market orientation. On the one hand, there is the Federal Skilled Worker Program that aims to cover Canada’s long-term need for highly qualified workers and uses a points system as the selection mechanism. On the other hand, there are among other the Federal Nominee Programs and the Live-in Caregiver Program, which are designed to alleviate acute labour shortages. The latest findings suggest that Canada has benefited from this two-pronged approach. The human capital-oriented reforms of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in 2002 have meant more successful integration of immigrants selected via the points system. And the Provincial Nominee Programs have managed to counteract some of the

Average annual income in Canadian dollars



Employment rate



Employment rates and average annual income of Provincial Nominees nominated in 2001 and Federal Skilled Workers, according to length of residence

(Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada¹⁸⁰)

weaknesses of the points system, particularly with respect to the geographical distribution of immigrants and the recruitment of medium qualified workers.

There are at least three important lessons Germany can learn from Canada's experience. First of all, a points system can yield good results, particularly for covering the long-term requirement for labour that exists in Germany for demographic reasons alone. Above all, it could raise the average level of education of immigrants. The second lesson is that a points system alone is not sufficient but needs to be a component of a more comprehensive immigration policy. Third, the success of the points system depends very much on how it is designed. Only if the awarding of points really does reflect the human capital of would-be immigrants will integration be successful in the long term. Useful categories for evaluation would seem to be educational qualification, age, language skills, work experience in the country itself and in some cases an existing job offer. In addition, objective criteria need to be developed for verifying the information provided, for example an official language test certificate.

Canada's experience teaches us in particular how very important language skills are. What is more, the success of immigrants depends not only on whether they have a general knowledge of the national language but on whether they speak it well enough for professional purposes. Here Germany is clearly at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Canada, for whereas many new arrivals in Canada speak English as their mother tongue or second language, it is almost impossible to find people who speak German as a mother tongue or second language outside the EU. Although this could to some extent be mitigated by the fact that particularly among

highly qualified people English is widely used as an alternative language (which should be taken into account in a points system), this illustrates a cardinal problem of German immigration policy: the pool of potential immigrants may actually be much smaller than many people believe.

Given this background, a points system would have a second important function in Germany, namely, to send a signal to the outside world that Germany is actively seeking to recruit immigrants. In the short term there is unlikely to be a run on Germany, so that one of Canada's biggest problems, namely, the huge backlog of applications, is unlikely to occur in Germany, at least initially. In addition, Canada's experience teaches us that the number of applications received can also be regulated by changing the minimum number of points required. If this is raised, then not only does the number of successful applications fall but also the overall number of applications since applicants are less likely to think their applications will be successful. The introduction of a points system should, however, not be the only measure for making Germany more attractive to potential immigrants. Even the classic country of immigration Canada takes active measures to make itself better known to would-be immigrants. Marketing Canada begins in the countries of origin of future immigrants – for example, at job fairs or directly via recruitment agencies. A central point of contact for would-be immigrants is the website of Citizenship and Immigration Canada which provides an overview of all the relevant information for immigrating to Canada – from a self-assessment according to the points system to an online text book with which to study for the citizenship test. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada also provides a national job postings centre via the portal Working in Canada. This makes the process easier not only for would-be immigrants but also for employers.

A points system would have advantages for Germany that go beyond the way it presents itself to the outside world. Vis-à-vis the German population such a transparent instrument of immigration management could help to eliminate existing reservations about a higher intake. Particularly the focus on highly qualified people and securing the country's prosperity in the long term could have a positive impact on public opinion.

Labour-market orientation to cover short-term needs

Whereas a points system could improve the supply of highly qualified workers in Germany in the long term, other instruments are required to cover specific shortages of skilled workers in particular sectors. Labour market-oriented models, which initially issue immigrants with temporary residence permits, have proven to be highly effective in Canada. In order to compete in the international market for immigrants, these should, however, hold out a clear perspective for making the transition from temporary to permanent residence. What can happen if this is lacking was demonstrated by Germany's disappointing experience with the so-called Green Card in the early 2000s.

In practice two versions of labour market-oriented immigration programs are encountered. Either a state can use a sectoral policy to accept only persons from particular occupations or with certain qualifications or else it can allow anyone with an existing job offer to enter the country once they have passed a labour market test.* The Canadian provinces use both systems under the

* Sectoral immigration programs can also acquire a human capital-oriented look if immigrants from a particular occupational group are allowed to enter the country even without a job offer. In principle such programs would be like points systems but with only one selection criterion, namely vocational qualification.

auspices of the Provincial Nominee Program. For temporary labour migrants, on the other hand, it is mainly sectoral channels that are available – for caregivers, seasonal workers in agriculture and other workers with low qualifications. Germany has likewise regulated temporary migration to date almost exclusively on a sectoral basis.*


A great weakness of sectoral immigration programs, however, is that short-term labour shortages must be reliably identifiable. In addition, these systems are often vulnerable to the political influence of interest groups and lobbies (see box on page 46). Thus Citizenship and Immigration Canada has discovered that only one province uses an indicator-supported system for its Provincial Nominee Program, while all the others estimate their requirements by talking to employers, industrial confederations, chambers of commerce and other actors.¹⁸³ Depending on the clout and interests of the actors in question this can sometimes mean that decisions are not taken solely on the basis of actual shortages. In view of this fact, Germany should at least consider recruiting temporary migrants via an open system, which allows those with job offers to enter the country irrespective of sector. In such a system a prior labour market test would be crucial.

A look at Sweden may serve to reveal the possible effects of an open immigration policy. Since 2008 the Swedish labour market has been open to all immigrants as long as they are employed under the same conditions as Swedes and as long as the job has been posted for at least ten days EU-wide. The latter provision serves as an

unbureaucratic form of priority test, which might make sense for Germany as well. Once immigrants have managed to clear both these hurdles, they initially receive a temporary residence permit valid for two years, which can be extended once for two years, before it leads after four years to a right to permanent residence. Family members (spouses and children) are entitled to the same residence rights as the principal applicant.¹⁸⁴

Two pillars of state immigration policy

Canada's experience with managed immigration teaches us that a single program is not sufficient to cover all labour requirements. It makes far more sense to distinguish between long- and short-term needs and to adapt immigration policy instruments accordingly. To cover a country's long-term needs for highly qualified people a human capital-oriented policy that uses a points system is advisable. This should award large numbers of points for general skills, but fewer points for occupation-specific skills.



(Own diagram)

* The EU's Blue Card scheme, designed to open the labour market for all immigrants who have tertiary education, is by virtue of its salary criterion aimed primarily at highly qualified persons.

Management desirable, but at what level?

So far the idea of managing immigration regionally has been little discussed in Germany. Provincial Nominee Programs contribute much in Canada to making the immigration system function well, but it would be impossible to translate them wholesale to Germany. Such programs appeal mainly to immigrants who are already in the country and who wish to transform their temporary residence status into a permanent one. In Germany this is possible in any case after five years. It would therefore only make sense to introduce them in Germany if they took the form of regionally managed programs designed to select new immigrants. Given that medium-sized companies in rural areas and in eastern Germany are increasingly short of skilled labour it looks, at least at first glance, as if such programs would fit the bill.

Nevertheless, this raises the question of whether the shortage of skilled labour in more remote regions is not simply a communications problem, in other words, companies located outside the major centres do not manage to communicate their labour requirements to potential immigrants. If this is indeed the case then it would be necessary to improve the marketing opportunities for companies in small towns and rural areas, for example via central employment data banks. Immigrants would then have the opportunity to receive a residence permit via the second, labour market-oriented pillar of immigration policy. It is questionable whether an additional program for regionally managing immigration would be necessary, for this would also make the system more complicated.* In Canada it has a role to play primarily because the country has no central labour market-oriented program for immigrants.

* The situation would look a little different if the second pillar of immigration policy were also to be managed sectorally. One argument in favour of this would be that regional actors can estimate demand more accurately than national actors can.

Needs analysis problematic

Sectoral immigration programs are popular because they aim to bring precisely those skilled workers into the country who are currently in demand. This may sound attractive, but their success depends entirely on how precisely labour market demand can be evaluated and how quickly this information can be translated into practice.

There are various methods for analysing labour shortages. In a market economy an acute demand could be identified by getting employers to pay a fee for additional labour from abroad. The more urgently a company needs additional labour, the more willing it will be to pay a price for this. In practice such a system could be regulated either via a set fee or via auction. The latter, however, would have the disadvantage that large companies could use their financial strength to distort the identification of demand.

In practice, planning is more popular than market economy methods. This relies either on indicator-based models for diagnosing labour shortages or on direct coordination with the actors involved, such as employers' associations, trade unions, chambers of trade and commerce and other interest groups. Here the analysis of indicators, such as unemployment rates for particular occupations, is regarded as more objective since the alternative always entails a danger of distortions caused by political influence.

Yet the decision to use indicators would still leave policy planners faced with a whole range of options. One relatively simple approach would be to compare the number of vacancies in a sector with the number of registered unemployed skilled workers in the same sector. In Germany this would be possible using data from the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* (Federal Employment Agency). One problem with doing this, however, may be that not all companies register their vacancies with the agency. The *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung* (Institute for Employment Research, IAB) estimates that the registration rate for vacancies in Germany is only about a third of the actual number.¹⁸⁵ What is more, statistics of this kind only reflect the past, which allows little to be concluded about future shortages.

A more suitable method for diagnosing labour shortages might be the IAB's annual survey of jobs on offer throughout the economy (*Erhebung des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Stellenangebots*) – a representative survey of around 75,000 companies. Since once again, however, this records the situation at a particular moment in time but does not offer any kind of prognosis, experts are sceptical about its usefulness in reliably identifying occupations where there is likely to be a shortage of labour in the future.¹⁸⁶

Given this scenario, immigration management guided by the job offer criterion including a labour market test with a simple European priority test would seem to be the best option for initially temporary migration outside the points system. After all, if it is possible to ensure that foreign workers are not being employed for excessively low wages, then a job offer to a foreigner ought to be sufficient indication of a labour shortage.

5.2

INTEGRATING NEWCOMERS

For immigration policy to be successful, skilled workers need not only to be brought into the country but also to find suitable employment quickly. As we have seen in the previous chapter, an intelligently designed immigration policy can provide an important basis for this. Yet unless accompanied by an integration policy it will not be in a position to solve the manifold problems and challenges that immigrants encounter in their new home. This applies especially if, as in Canada, immigrants are able to enter the country without an existing job offer.

A Canadian study has shown just how difficult it is for newcomers to find employment. Even four years after their arrival, 46 percent of respondents said that finding a suitable job had so far been their greatest difficulty in Canada. Half of these claimed that a lack of work experience in Canada had been the reason for the difficulties they experienced; 37 percent named a lack of contacts on the labour market; a further 35 percent had encountered problems because their foreign qualifications had not been recognised; and 32 percent complained about language barriers.*¹⁸⁷

False expectations, a lack of networks and a poor knowledge of Canadian culture as well as a weak command of English or French are all factors still making immigrants less likely to be employed and meaning they earn less than Canadian-born people. Not all of these problems can be solved through an active

integration policy – but many of them can. The government therefore assists immigrants with a whole range of programs and initiatives that go under the heading of Settlement Services.** Alarmed by the increasing integration problems in the 1990s, the government has repeatedly raised the budget for these programs. From Ottawa alone almost 600 million Canadian dollars are said to have been allocated to this sector for the year 2012/2013 – around three times as much as in 2005/2006.***¹⁸⁸

Integration begins in the country of origin

One important principle of Canadian settlement policy is that preparations should be made for it even before immigrants leave their country of origin. In this phase, alongside the acquisition of language skills, the task is to provide future immigrants with all the important information they need about living and working in Canada. This aims on the one hand to avoid arousing false or exaggerated expectations and on the other

to make immigrants familiar with Canadian culture and social customs. After all, many new arrivals stumble over things that Canadians take for granted, such as correct forms of address, the culture of discussion or how to submit a job application. Many immigrants to Canada participating in a survey complained that they had not automatically been offered a job upon arriving in Canada – the concept of actively seeking employment was an alien one in their countries of origin.¹⁸⁹

The Canadian government launched the first pre-arrival program, the Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) Initiative, in 1998. It is aimed at refugees and economic immigrants. During seminars lasting one or more days would-be immigrants are given insights into how everyday life functions in Canada, including information about prices and the cost of living, climate, rights and obligations of inhabitants, looking for a place to live and employment. Participation is voluntary and the seminars are usually conducted in the participants' native language.

Over the years the Canadian Orientation Abroad Program has grown considerably. Whereas in 1998 only 773 persons took part in the seminars, the annual number has now risen to more than 13,000 in 14 different countries.¹⁹⁰ The International Organization for Migration, which runs the program for Citizenship and Immigration Canada, can provide additional mobile training centres in other countries as required.

* It was possible to name more than one category.

** Settlement Services are not designed exclusively to help immigrants achieve economic success but also have the broader goal of promoting the social, cultural and political integration of newcomers. This chapter will be devoted mainly to programs designed to help immigrants find suitable employment.

*** This does not include Quebec, which pursues a quasi autonomous integration policy. In 2012/2013 at least 283 million Canadian dollars in federal funding were allocated to the province for the purposes of integration.


The main focus of Canadian Orientation Abroad, however, is to prepare refugees from crisis regions for their new life in Canada. For highly qualified labour migrants the content of the seminars is often not very helpful, since the challenges they will face after arriving in Canada are of a different nature and they need more specific information about the labour market. For this reason the ministry responsible launched the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program (CIIP) in 2007. Originally conceived as a two-year pilot project, this program aimed to provide immigrants selected via the points system not only with general information prior to their arrival in Canada but also with a personal plan drawn up in individual consultations to ensure their successful integration.¹⁹¹ Within this framework the consultants also point immigrants to other integration programs offered by partner institutions in Canada. Thus new arrivals have a place they can turn to after arrival to help them plan the first steps they will take in the new country.

The Canadian government has now extended the project until at least 2014 and has broadened it to address not only Federal Skilled Workers but also Provincial Nominees. The reason why the program has been expanded is because it was so successful – those who had taken part found it much easier than other immigrants to quickly find employment commensurate with their qualifications after arriving in Canada. Among immigrants who attended the CIIP, 93 percent of those who now have a job managed to find employment within six months of arriving. All in all 67 percent of all those who had attended the program were employed. This figure might seem rather low at first glance, but one should remember that family members accompanying the principal applicant to Canada who were not actively seeking employment were also allowed to participate

Well prepared for the move

Five out of six people who had participated in the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program said that the advice they had received in their country of origin had helped them to understand better what they would need to do to find a job in Canada. The program, however, not only provides participants with information but also motivates them to try to find a job commensurate with their skills.

Understanding the steps necessary to find employment



More motivated to find a job in the desired occupational field



Survey of participants who completed the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program, 2010, N = 1,497
(Data source: Centre for Community Based Research¹⁹²)

in the program. In interviews many participants also said that the knowledge and skills they had obtained from the program had been very helpful in finding a job. Thus 91 percent of those asked to evaluate the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program said they would recommend it to others.¹⁹²

Providing future immigrants with individual advice in their countries of origin entails a major logistical effort and costs a lot of money. Currently the Association of Canadian Community Colleges, which runs the program for the Canadian government, has branches in four countries (China, India, the Philippines and Great Britain), which enable it to offer the program in 23 different countries.¹⁹⁴ Since, however, economic immigrants can theoretically come from anywhere in the world, the outreach of these programs is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, the program reaches 70 percent of all immigrants in the Federal Skilled Worker category and 44 percent of the Provincial Nominees.¹⁹⁵

In order to allow other categories of immigrant to benefit from integration programs before leaving for Canada, the Canadian government also runs a number of websites that provide information and in some cases even enable would-be immigrants to make their first contacts in Canada. A good example of this is Canada InfoNet, the centrepiece of which is a mentoring program that puts immigrants in touch with Canadians from the same occupational field. The Canadian Immigrant Integration Program also directs its participants to an Internet portal, Integrated Pre-Arrival Services Online. Here immigrants can practice communications skills, hone their job applications and even make contact with Canadian employers.

Canadian Immigrant Integration Program

What is it?

Group orientation and information programs on language, recognition of credentials, education and employment; individual consultations including a personal action plan; further direction to programs in Canada

When does it take place?

Prior to leaving the country of origin

Who offers it?

Association of Canadian Community Colleges on behalf of Citizenship and Immigration Canada; the program has branches in four countries

Who participates?

Pre-selected Federal Skilled Workers and Provincial Nominees and their families

One problem for many immigrants is to identify the most suitable programs for themselves out of the multitude of offers. This process often leads to frustration and wrong information. Therefore immigrants need to be provided with the right addresses right at the beginning of the integration process. The practice of the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program of sending letters of invitation to seminars directly to future participants is exemplary here.

What is my qualification worth overseas?

Part of preparing for a new life in Canada is to find out what educational and vocational credentials are worth on the Canadian labour market. This is often not easy, as access to regulated professions is frequently controlled by the individual provinces, which in some cases have very different certification procedures. In order to find their way through the jungle of regulations, immigrants require centralised, reliable information – if possible before they leave their country of origin. Only in this way can they set about obtaining any additional qualifications they may need in a timely fashion.

For a long time recognition of educational credentials in Canada was anything but satisfactory: 40 percent of all immigrants reported in the early 2000s that they had had problems in this respect – and less than a quarter had addressed this question before leaving their country of origin.¹⁹⁶ For this reason the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program has included the recognition of foreign qualifications among its measures, enabling future immigrants to receive information about this as part of their individual consultations.

An important actor with regard to recognising credentials is the government-financed Foreign Credential Referral Office (FCRO), which provides immigrants with practical advice. A central tool of the FCRO is a website structured according to occupation groups that provides links to all of the more than 400 licensing offices in Canada. The fact that 69 percent of the total of 500,000 visits to the website in 2011 were from abroad illustrates how useful the portal is for future immigrants.¹⁹⁷

Yet access to information is certainly not the only hurdle that immigrants have to cross in getting their credentials recognised. Even more important is that the recognition process itself should be fair, transparent and above all swift. A third of those who had not managed to clarify before leaving for Canada whether their qualifications would be recognised cited lack of time as the reason.¹⁹⁸ While this may have partly to do with the immigrants' own individual time management, the sheer endless recognition process may also have a role to play. Recently the Canadian government therefore set itself the goal of taking decisions on such matters within the space of a year.¹⁹⁹

The one-year deadline is a central element of the Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications, which the federal government approved together with the provinces in 2009. While this framework is not a legally binding document, various levels of government have committed themselves to making the recognition process more open and to bringing the procedures in the different provinces into line so that approval by one province will generally mean acceptance by others as well.²⁰⁰

Given the many different organisations involved in the process, it is rather difficult for the government in Ottawa to play a greater role than that of a coordinator. Via the Progress Reports published annually it keeps the issue in the public eye and provides successful projects and initiatives with a platform for presenting themselves. Thus nurses, for instance, can now test their skills online and prepare themselves for the

national licensing exam. Moreover, agreements now exist between Canadian and foreign accreditation offices on the reciprocal recognition of licenses in some professional fields like engineering or architecture.²⁰¹

Nevertheless, all of these are piecemeal and in many cases bilateral approaches to finding a solution, which suggests that there is no all-encompassing solution to the problem. The situation can only be made easier for immigrants via many small steps. Here it is important to coordinate the progress made and to give immigrants central access to information. The system could, for example, be made more efficient by establishing national licensing offices, which would in the short-term implement provincial regulations and in the long-term seek to harmonise licensing criteria.²⁰²

Bridging programs – bridges to success

The Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications provides for three possible outcomes to the recognition process. The agencies responsible can either directly allow immigrants to practice their professions or require them to take additional training courses or bar them completely from practicing their profession. Providing immigrants with programs to adapt their qualifications to Canadian requirements is therefore a key to their successful integration. Canadians call these bridging programs, in other words, programs that close or “bridge” gaps in knowledge or qualifications. Ideally bridging programs should start before (via the Internet) or directly after immigrants’ arrival in Canada. In reality this seldom happens, however, since despite all efforts the recognition process is usually not complete by this point in time.

Bridging programs exist in many different occupational fields and are offered both by universities and by specialised agencies. The Ryerson University in Toronto alone offers courses in areas as diverse as accounting, nutritional sciences, social work, physiotherapy and midwifery. These programs teach both theory and practice and their length is often tailored to meet the requirements of participants. Midwives, for example, can complete their program in either nine or twelve months depending on their prior knowledge and then go on to take the official licensing exam. Alongside programs for specific occupations, various organisations also offer more general programs that are not designed directly to teach specialist knowledge but instead to train so-called soft skills – from job application techniques to the correct discussion culture.

Many bridging programs are publicly subsidised. Nevertheless, immigrants often have to pay part of the cost of the courses themselves. In Canada they can take advantage of various options to receive loans on favourable terms for this purpose. A well-known example is the Immigrant Access Fund founded in 2003, which people in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan can use. With support from the government in Ottawa it provides cheap loans of up to 10,000 Canadian dollars to immigrants who want to attend a qualification course. Many of Canada’s major banks have in the meantime followed this model and are themselves offering mini-loans specially tailored to finance further training programs for immigrants.

Linking theory and practice

Further training outside the workplace can help to bridge various gaps in qualifications. It cannot, however, solve the problem that in many regulated professions practical work experience is a precondition for becoming licensed.²⁰³ And even in professions that are not regulated many immigrants find themselves at a disadvantage because they have no work experience in Canada. To counteract this problem the Canadian government introduced the Federal Internship for Newcomers Program in 2008 designed to give immigrants the opportunity to do internships in the public sector. An even more comprehensive program is the NGO-run Career Bridge program which has been

Career Bridge

What is it?

Paid, professional internship lasting between four and twelve months designed to facilitate immigrants’ entry into employment in Canada

When does it take place?

During immigrants’ first three years in Canada

Who offers it?

Career Edge (an NGO)

Who participates?

Immigrants with educational qualifications and international professional experience who have not worked in Canada before

Enhanced Language Training

What is it?

Occupation-specific language training in Canada's official languages (English and French); Bridge-to-work assistance (help in finding a job, internships, mentoring programs, cultural orientation)

When does it take place?

After arrival in Canada

Who offers it?

Service providers (provinces / territories, employers, educational institutions, NGOs, local communities, aid organisations) on behalf of Citizenship and Immigration Canada

Who participates?

Immigrants whose place of residence is Canada and who are immediately available to the labour market

finding internships for immigrants in companies since 2003. This program benefits both the immigrants, who are paid for the work they do, and the companies themselves which are thus supplied with pre-selected personnel to match their needs. According to Career Edge, the organisation that runs this program, more than 80 percent of participants manage to find a full-time job in their special area after completing an internship.²⁰⁴

In order to find a job in Canada it is especially important to learn occupation-specific vocabulary in English or French. While many immigrants have a good command of English and/or French for everyday situations, their occupation-specific language skills are often inadequate. The Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada Program (LINC), which offers free basic courses in English and French, can only partly compensate for this. For this reason the Canadian government initiated a new program in 2003, the Enhanced Language Training (ELT), which offers occupation-specific language training as well as bridge-to-work components. In three-quarters of the cases, the latter are internships in companies, but they often also include mentoring programs and bring together immigrants and Canadian practicians to exchange experience. To what extent the ELT program has an influence on how successful immigrants are at finding suitable employment has unfortunately not been thoroughly evaluated. Some surveys have, however, revealed that it has enabled immigrants both to improve language skills and to find out more about the Canadian labour market.²⁰⁵

Mentoring programs have also become established outside Enhanced Language Training as a popular instrument of Canadian settlement policy. In 2004 Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) launched a mentoring partnership that links around 1,000 newcomers every year with professionals from their field of occupation. The latter promise at least 24 hours of personal exchange to provide immigrants with insights into the field in which they plan to work, to provide tips for applications and interviews and to suggest potential

employers. Companies that make their employees available for the mentoring program often stand to benefit themselves, since this channel allows them to make direct contact with potential employees.

The Mentoring Partnership

What is it?

Mentoring programs that bring together qualified immigrants and established employees from the same occupational or industrial sector; at least 24 hours of personal exchange within four months (country-specific information about the chosen field of occupation, building up networks, help in looking for potential employers and in applying for jobs)

When does it take place?

Within immigrants' first three years in Canada

Who offers it?

Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC)

Who participates?

Immigrants with corresponding educational qualifications and international work experience but with no prior work experience in Canada

As the organisation that runs the programs, TRIEC's activities are all designed to bring together as many people as possible who may have an influence on the employment of immigrants. These include representatives of employers, associations, educational institutions and regulatory authorities, but also government officials at various levels and the immigrants themselves. The fact that employers are involved in the integration process is regarded as a key factor in the program's success.²⁰⁶ This focus is also reflected in the Hire Immigrants initiative launched in 2005, which addresses employers directly and explains the advantages of a multicultural personnel policy in the context of demographic change. TRIEC's very successful role as an innovative actor in settlement policy is illustrated by the fact that many Canadian cities now have Immigrant Employment Councils modelled on TRIEC.²⁰⁷

Immigrant Employment Councils

What are they?

Occupation-specific mentoring programs; paid internships; programs to heighten employers' awareness of the advantages of multicultural staff; improving hiring procedures; exchange of experience between employers

Who participates?

Various labour-market relevant actors (government, employers, regulatory authorities, teachers, community associations, immigrants)

Where are they located?

Immigration Employment Councils exist in 13 locations (Fredericton and Moncton, Halifax, Waterloo Region, London, North Bay, Montreal, Niagara, Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, British Columbia, Edmonton and Auckland)

What is their purpose?

To improve access to the labour market for qualified immigrants; to change attitudes to immigrants; to create a welcoming culture


A welcoming culture Canadian style

Social contacts and personal relationships remain the most important factor deciding the success or failure of immigrants on the Canadian labour market. In the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada around 40 percent of immigrants selected via the points system said that friends had helped them to deal with problems finding employment. Only about half named government facilities as places they had turned to.²⁰⁸ All the more important, then, to anchor integration policy locally – in local communities and city districts – and to eliminate barriers between newcomers and the established inhabitants.

Here so-called Local Immigration Partnerships (LIP) are of growing significance. They bring together government representatives and relevant actors from the NGO sector to come up with integration concepts tailored to specific local problems. In their practical work they not only use many of the instruments listed in this chapter but also other channels such as sports events and other leisure activities. Initially LIPs existed only in the Province of Ontario, but after the parliament in 2010 recommended the idea as best practice that should serve as a model they are now spreading to other parts of the country as well.²⁰⁹ One specific advantage of the partnerships is that by involving many actors they avoid duplications in the programs offered, for normally the Canadian government finances many civil society organisations, which then run integration programs independently of one another.

Friends are the greatest help

Around 40 percent of Federal Skilled Workers, i.e. immigrants selected via the points system, say friends have helped them the most to find employment. Only half as many report that they have received the greatest help from educational institutions or government organisations. A successful integration policy therefore cannot rely solely on publicly advertised jobs but must also actively support social integration at the immigrants' place of residence.



Where Federal Skilled Workers (who arrived in 2000/2001) turn to solve their biggest problems in seeking employment, six months, two years and four years after arriving in Canada

(Data source: Xue, L., *Portrait of an Integration Process: Difficulties encountered and resources relied on for newcomers in their first 4 years in Canada*)

Ideally a local integration policy should be designed not only to ensure that immigrants find the right contacts in seeking employment but also that mistrust and prejudices between different ethnic groups are eliminated. Unfortunately, despite all the efforts made so far it has not proven possible to eliminate racism and discrimination

completely from Canada. In the only Ethnic Diversity Survey ever to be conducted, in 2002, one member in five of a visible minority said that he or she had sometimes or often been unfairly treated on account of their skin colour in the past five years. A further 15 percent had occasionally had this experience.²¹⁰ In order to prevent this from happening in the future, the government in 2005 drafted a document entitled Canada's Action Plan Against Racism (CAPAR). The plan's goals included not only giving support to victims of racism but also running programs to systematically promote tolerance and allow social inclusion for everyone living in Canada.

With its Welcoming Communities Initiative (WCI), which funded various programs between 2005 and 2010, Citizenship and Immigration Canada also made a contribution to the anti-racism plan CAPAR. The initiative pursued three goals in particular: it sought to forge connections between newcomers and Canadians, to eliminate barriers to integration at the community level and to support educational projects against racism.²¹¹ With the modernisation of the settlement program the initiative has been absorbed into the field of Community Connections.* Since programs to promote a welcoming culture are a long-term venture, it is less easy to evaluate their success than that of labour market programs. An evaluation of the Welcoming Communities Initiative nevertheless concluded that it has made an important contribution to eliminating barriers between immigrants and Canadians.²¹²

Local Immigration Partnerships

What are they?

Settlement and integration programs with a community-specific strategy; active cooperation between host communities and immigrants

Who participates?

Various interest groups at the local level (community organisations, government representatives, settlement authorities, employers, schools, libraries, organisations offering language training, health centres, services for families and children)

Where are they located?

Citizenship and Immigration Canada funds Local Immigration Partnerships, which are mainly located in Ontario; they are led by regional governments or community organisations

What is their purpose?

Furthering cooperation between those responsible; explicit inclusion of settlement and integration issues in community planning processes; better coordination of integration measures; promoting economic, social and political inclusion of immigrants within communities

* A research consortium of universities and other higher education institutions in the province of Ontario now bears the name Welcoming Communities Initiative.

Multiculturalism – a small program with a big impact


Often organisations working in the field of anti-discrimination do not obtain their funding exclusively via settlement policy, but also via the Multiculturalism Program, which aims to promote the long-term integration of immigrants. In this context the Inter-Action program made around 14 million Canadian dollars available in 2010/2011 for 46 different projects and 94 events all over Canada. Among the recipients are primarily organisations whose goals are to facilitate encounters between people of different cultures and faiths.²¹³

By comparison with the settlement sector the funding allocated to multicultural policy is very limited. Many observers emphasise, however, that the value of multiculturalism is more as a symbolic recognition of ethnic diversity than a concrete program.²¹⁴ What is more, the policy is manifested not only in funding programs but also in the commitment of all government organs to allow the idea of multiculturalism to help shape their policies.²¹⁵

Opinion polls have shown that this approach has certainly been successful. In a survey conducted by Focus Canada in 2010, for example, around 86 percent of respondents said they regarded multiculturalism as an important part of Canadian identity.²¹⁶ What is more, a large number of other indicators, such as the number of bi-cultural marriages, show that social integration in Canada,

brought about among other things by its policy of multiculturalism, has been extremely successful in international comparison.²¹⁷ This is illustrated most clearly by the large number of people taking on Canadian citizenship every year – between 100,000 and 200,000 people or 84 percent of immigrants entitled to do so.²¹⁸ These figures, which are higher than almost anywhere else in the world, reflect a fundamental principle of Canadian immigration policy: that the state aims to recruit not just a workforce but also future citizens and that integration is only complete when immigrants formally take on Canadian nationality.

The road to employment



Innovation versus coordination

In Canada there are a large number of innovative and successful programs for integrating immigrants. Yet policy-makers still face major challenges, for while there is no shortage of good ideas, the difficulty consists in coordinating all the many different actors and providing the same services throughout the country's huge territory. This is made additionally difficult by the fact that it is generally not the state that runs the integration programs but civil society organisations contracted to do so, the so-called Community Partners. Since these organisations are familiar with regional characteristics, they are likely to produce the most innovative and the most economical approaches to solving problems. At the same time, however, they are scarcely able to provide a comprehensive service everywhere, since they are located mainly in urban centres. Above and beyond that, various civil society actors offer similar services, often independently of one another. The government is thus faced with performing a balancing act between allowing its civil society partners sufficient latitude while at the same time coordinating the various programs so as to minimise duplications and regional imbalances.

Here the government faces a further challenge, having delegated responsibility for integration policy in certain provinces to regional governments in the 1990s. After Quebec, which has its own completely separate immigration policy, the provinces enjoying the greatest degree of autonomy are British Columbia and Manitoba. Although they receive money from Ottawa, they can plan and implement their settlement programs almost completely independently of the central government.

Arrangements of this kind need not lead to worse outcomes. Many experts have praised Manitoba's integration policy as particularly exemplary.²¹⁹ With Manitoba Start the government provides immigrants with a central place to which would-be migrants can turn for advice while still in their country of origin and which accompanies them after their arrival in Canada. Among other things, Manitoba Start points all newcomers to the so-called ENTRY program – a three-week orientation program that provides immigrants with important information about language training and the recognition of foreign qualifications.

The growing dissatisfaction with the special treatment accorded to immigrants in certain provinces led the government in Ottawa to announce in 2012 its intention to recentralise integration policy. Simultaneously, for quite some time now it has been supporting the process of delegating certain responsibilities to the local level – to communities and city districts, in other words. The best examples of this are the Local Immigration Partnerships and the Immigrant Employment Councils. By networking relevant actors locally, the idea is to achieve more efficient problem-solving. Yet here too it is important to evaluate the initiatives implemented in

order to apply promising ideas and concepts on a broad scale. Although this involves costs, they would be much higher if Canada did not manage to integrate immigrants quickly. What is more, via best practices pilot projects can be identified that are worth pursuing on a permanent basis. The resulting long-term funding timetables give Community Partners planning certainty, thus avoiding the danger of financial disarray and of endangering their valuable know-how.

For the new arrivals it is also important that the various actors not only become networked locally but that integration is viewed holistically, with assorted integration programs which build on one another. This holistic approach is, however, still impaired by the fact that information often fails to be gathered together in one place. Good counter-examples are the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program and Career Bridge, which only recently concluded a partnership allowing Career Bridge to view the data bank containing details of participants in the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program and thus to match immigrants and placements more precisely, more quickly and above all, all over the country. This kind of coordination works on an even bigger scale through the Canadian Immigrant Settlement Sector Alliance, which networks some 450 civil society actors to provide a forum for coordinating their programs.

What can Germany learn?

It is now a well-known fact that for decades Germany neglected to do anything about integrating its immigrants. Only in 2005, when the Immigration Act was passed, did the federal government establish integration courses as a central instrument to familiarise people with a migration background with the German language and culture. At the same time it launched a social dialogue on the issue of immigration, which culminated in the National Action Plan Integration in 2012. Conditioned by its neglect of the issue in the past, the focus of this policy is less on new arrivals than on people who have been living in Germany for decades or who were even born here.

A modern settlement policy for new arrivals will become necessary particularly as Germany begins to manage its immigration policy more actively, especially if it decides to introduce a points system that will allow immigrants to enter the country even without a job offer. In some fields there are already some signs of an integration policy of this kind. This applies particularly to the recognition of foreign credentials. With the passing of the Recognition Act in 2012, Germany stepped ahead of Canada in this respect – at least in legal terms – for now all immigrants with a foreign vocational qualification in an apprenticeship occupation or a graduate profession regulated Germany-wide will gain the right to be informed within three months about the status of their qualification. A further strength of the law is that the applicant must not necessarily be in Germany.

The Canadian recipe for success of “integration before entering the country” has thus at least in this respect already become established here as well. Access to information is also well regulated via the bilingual Internet portal “Recognition in Germany” which uses the “recognition finder”, an easy-to-use instrument that matches immigrants with the authorities relevant to their qualifications. But the Recognition Act is not a general panacea either, for it only applies to those graduates who want to practice a profession regulated at the federal level. Professions regulated by the individual states, such as engineers or teachers as well as most unregulated professions, by contrast, are not covered by the law.

A great strength of Canadian integration policy is the proliferation of bridging programs. These help immigrants to acquire the skills and qualifications that will allow them to enter employment successfully. In Germany there are far fewer opportunities for immigrants to adapt their qualifications than in Canada. Particularly the linking of theory and practice – which is done in Canada via the mentoring and internship programs – is still inadequate in Germany.²²⁰ Access to orientation and information programs in the immigrants’ countries of origin – comparable with the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program – and offers of mini-loans for measures to enhance qualifications are also in need of further improvements.

One promising method for adapting qualifications – the so-called ESF-BAMF courses – is being funded in Germany by the European Social Fund. These courses are designed to provide occupation-specific language training and often also include internships and visits to companies. They thus resemble the Canadian Enhanced Language Training program, which the government introduced because the language skills taught in the basic language courses were not sufficient for professional communication.

Skilled workers need very good language skills

How much sense do German integration courses really make, given their rather modest goal of helping immigrants to attain the B1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, which would enable them to be able to converse about familiar topics in simple language. This is unlikely to be sufficient for skilled workers if they are to compete successfully with Germans on the labour market. For other immigrants, such as refugees or relatives coming to join their families, they have proven useful in the past and are one reason why people who have completed such courses are much more likely to find employment than those who have not, and why they make more progress on the labour market than other immigrants.²²¹

The Canadian experience also shows that even the best integration programs are useless if immigrants don’t know about them. This makes integrated programs like Manitoba Start run by the Canadian province of the same name all the more valuable. Very little networking of this kind takes place in

Germany and it needs to be expanded. A good starting point is the Migration Counselling for Adult Immigrants (*Migrationsberatung für erwachsene Zuwanderer*), which provides newcomers with much free practical advice in the first three years about such issues as language, employment and many other things and which culminates in a personal development plan. Another promising idea is the Make it in Germany Internet portal, which provides information about all important aspects of immigration.

Germany faces coordination problems too

Like in Canada, integration policy in Germany is not an exclusively federal affair but is rather a network of responsibilities involving different actors. Since the federal government long neglected to offer any integration measures at all, many local communities have tried to close the gap themselves, albeit with little central steering or coordination, resulting in a jungle of different programs. In its annual report for 2011 the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration complained that many local communities were still trying "to reinvent the wheel". It appealed for the creation of a central service agency for communal integration issues that would facilitate the networking of communities and help to identify successful projects and apply them more widely.²²²

Canada's experience teaches us that it is not only necessary to network local communities but also to involve various local actors in integration policy. In Canada this happens via Local Immigration Partnerships and Immigrant Employment Councils. Such forms of cooperation with the private sector are still few and far between in Germany, even though the Stuttgart Pact for Integration launched back in 2001 offers a promising model. The Pact is a good example of how it is possible to acquire funding for integration projects external to government policy – a task that will gain in importance given strapped local budgets.

The focus on local integration partnerships does not, however, mean that all measures connected with integration should take place at the communal level. Although local communities have detailed knowledge of the local labour market they do not have the capacity to offer comprehensive bridging programs and further training. The local authorities do, however, have an important role to play in the creation of a welcoming culture, for local actors can play a key role in intercultural tolerance and understanding – e.g. through information campaigns or political education programs.

Multiculturalism German style

In Canada multiculturalism policy is often regarded as the key to ensuring that immigration gains widespread acceptance in the population and that immigrants largely report positively on their experience. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that German policy-makers will espouse multiculturalism in the near future. For such negative connotations have been attached to the word in recent years that it is unsuitable as a means of gaining popular support for a new start in immigration policy. In any case, the goals of policies should be more important than the name they are known by. In Canada multiculturalism means eliminating cultural barriers between different groups of the population in order to allow all inhabitants to be included in social and political life and to promote a creative exchange between all the different sections of the population. In practice German integration policy is actually not so far removed from multiculturalism policy of the Canadian ilk. This is manifest in various projects to combat racism and discrimination but also in the recent initiative by the federal government to make it easier for people with a migration background to find employment in public administration.

In the long term policy-makers and society should, despite the initiatives mentioned, make a clearer commitment to ethnic diversity than they have done to date and also highlight more strongly the successes that have been achieved so far. The German immigration debate is still largely informed by the guest worker policies of the twentieth century and by the long-term integration problems that this engendered. This stands in the way of an objective and future-oriented discussion about actively managed immigration, which is becoming ever more necessary in the twenty-first century. Canada's experience has demonstrated the immense impact to be had by openly espousing immigration.

5.3

INTEGRATING THE SECOND GENERATION


Not only does Canada manage to integrate newcomers better and more quickly than Germany, their children's educational achievements are also higher than those of children with Canadian-born parents. Indeed, the offspring of immigrants are even able to improve on the educational lead their parents already have vis-à-vis Canadian-born people. While the children of immigrants have a harder time entering the labour market than their "native" peers, they still mostly manage to translate their educational advantage into a higher employment rate and higher salaries. Their educational lead means that immigrant children also do much better in terms of employment than their parents; the latter, on the other hand, do worse than Canadian-born people on all the indicators considered (see Chapter 3).²²³

The situation is completely different in Germany: there immigrants on average have less education than native-born Germans. Almost half of them do not even have a vocational qualification. What is more, their children do not manage to close the educational gap vis-à-vis native-born Germans that they have "inherited" from their parents. So even in the second generation Germany finds it more difficult to integrate immigrants than Canada does. But why do immigrant children in Canada perform better compared with both immigrant children in Germany and with children of Canadian-born parents?


Immigrant children in Canada are more highly qualified

In Canada the children of immigrants perform better educationally than the children of Canadian-born parents. They are 1.5 times as likely to have a high educational qualification as children of Canadian-born parents, many of whom obtain a low educational qualification. The picture in Germany is completely different: there the children of immigrants trail a long way behind the children of native-born Germans. The generally small share of highly qualified people in Germany can be partly explained by the fact that roughly one person in three in the age group in question is still training or studying. Canada's faster education system means that its share in this category is not even half that in Germany.

Children of immigrant parents
 Children of native-born parents



Educational qualifications of 20- to 29-year-old children of immigrant and native-born parents in Canada and Germany, 2007
(Data based on: Liebig, T., Widmaier, S.²²⁴)



Better conditions from the start and much upward educational mobility

One reason for the high educational level of the second generation is the selection of immigrants. Canada's human capital-oriented immigration policy means that it attracts mainly university graduates. The higher educational level of newcomers compared with that of Canadian-born people, in turn, has a positive impact on how their children perform at school. But only about half of the educational gap between the children of immigrants and children of Canadian-born parents can be attributed to parental education.²²⁶ The other half of the explanation is that immigrant children are disproportionately often upwardly mobile in educational terms.²²⁷ In general, the educational achievement of immigrant children is largely independent of the educational level of their parents.²²⁸

But why is this? One factor that may play a role is the expectations of immigrants and their children. Thus members of visible minorities set themselves higher educational goals than others even if the educational level of their parents is the same. Overall, almost four-fifths of 15-year-olds in this group want to obtain a university degree. By contrast, only just under 60 percent of their Canadian-born peers who do not belong to a visible minority set themselves this goal. Much suggests that the members of both these groups have adopted the expectations of their parents, for the latter's educational goals are very similar to those of their children.²²⁹ A possible explanation for their high educational aspirations might be that immigrants – especially the large group of economic immigrants – have come to Canada looking for a better life and therefore have a stronger interest in the upward social mobility of their children.

The educational upward mobility of immigrant children cannot, however, be explained solely in terms of higher ambitions. They are, after

Big differences in educational achievement

The Toronto District School Board evaluated the educational achievement levels of students attending ninth grade in 2006. By 2011, almost 79 percent had graduated from secondary school, while 14 percent had left before completing their secondary education. The remaining 7 percent were taking an extra year of school. The Board then used information from the Student and Parent Census to compare the educational achievement of various groups of students. This evaluation is used as a basis for providing extra help to groups who will have particular difficulty completing their secondary education.

all, often at a disadvantage vis-à-vis children of Canadian-born parents because their mother tongue is not English or French. In addition, they can only fulfil their ambitions if the environment offers them opportunities to realise their potential. Here a key role is played by the Canadian school system in which all children are taught together from kindergarten up to the end of junior high school in ninth grade. Only after that do they follow separate paths.²³⁰ Immigrant children therefore have a long time, comparatively speaking, to close the language gap. Where necessary they also receive special remedial teaching.

Individual support for school students in Toronto

In addition to the governments of Canada's provinces, the regional education authorities also have a big say in how the Canadian education system is designed. The largest of these is the Toronto District School Board, which administers 600 schools and some 250,000 students.²³¹ Located in Canada's largest city, it organises the schooling of children and adolescents on a day-to-day basis. One major challenge for the School Board is to provide education for school students who are ethnically and culturally highly diverse: in Toronto, one student in four

was born outside Canada, and four-fifths of the students have at least one immigrant parent. Hence the share of students with a migration background (as defined in Germany) is much higher than in major German cities. Nevertheless, the educational achievement of Canadian students from immigrant families is impressive.

The Toronto District School Board is guided by its Equity Foundation Statement formulated in 2000. In it the Board states its commitment to give all students the opportunity to make the most of their abilities.²³² It thus focuses not

Learning Opportunities Index

What is it?

An index that measures the social structure of students in a school with a view to funding schools according to their needs

What does it measure?

It measures the income structure and educational level of parents as well as the family structures in the students' domestic environments. Schools are then ranked according to how much remedial support their students need. The index is recalculated every two years

Who offers it?

Toronto District School Board

Why?

To ensure equal educational opportunities for children irrespective of their social background

only on immigrant children but tries to compensate for any disadvantages that individual students (or groups of students) may suffer. In order to do this, however, these groups need to be identified. The School Board therefore conducts a Student and Parent Census at regular intervals to gather information not only about socio-economic factors, such as ethno-racial background, student place of birth or parental education and family income, but also about the school atmosphere, extra-curricular activities outside school, students' educational goals and even sexual orientation. Since the data are confidential but not anonymous, the educational achievements of individual students can be documented over time. This allows groups to be identified that have a higher risk of performing badly at school.²³³

The Toronto District School Board believes that equal opportunities can be offered via remedial teaching tailored to students' individual needs, and not by treating all children the same way. For children in need of special help an Individual Education Plan is drawn up. This contains specific annual goals that teachers formulate together with parents.²³⁴ Teachers are specially trained to be able to fulfil this active role. In order to avoid possible discrimination arising from particular teaching methods, the school curricula are subject to an ongoing revision.²³⁵

Nevertheless, even in Toronto children from socially weak environments find it more difficult to attain a high educational qualification.²³⁶ Schools in problem districts therefore have to do more to address their students' individual needs. But they can only do this if they receive sufficient funding. In 2000, the Toronto District School Board therefore developed the Learning Opportunities Index with which to identify schools in need of special support because of the social structure of their students. Compiled every two years, the index is based on a series of indicators that are relevant to the home environment of students. These include

English as a Second Language

What is it?

A language-support program at elementary and secondary schools

How does it work?

In elementary schools language support is provided by the class teacher or an additional language teacher; in secondary schools separate courses are offered at different language levels; this support is integrated in the regular curriculum and allows immigrant children to participate in normal school life

Who offers it?

Toronto District School Board

Who participates?

Students with language special needs; if required, participation may continue after graduating from school

Why?

To overcome deficits in the language of instruction as quickly as possible

average income, the share of low-income families and families receiving social assistance, the share of adults with a low level of education and the share of lone parents. These rankings enable those schools most in need of support to receive extra funding from a funding reserve established specially for this purpose. This is designed to allow schools to compensate for a lack of parental or neighbourhood support.²³⁷

Boost language skills – involve parents

Poor language skills are often a major hurdle for the children of immigrants. For more than one child in two at the schools administered by the Toronto District School Board, English is not their mother tongue or the main language spoken at home.²³⁸ Language skills are, however, a major factor in educational achievement. Deficits in the language of instruction make it difficult for students to follow in class. English as a Second Language (ESL) programs are designed for all students whose mother tongue is not English and who have been identified in an assessment test as being behind in their schooling. Both immigrant children and children born into immigrant families in Canada may attend ESL programs.²³⁹ In elementary school, ESL programs may be conducted both during regular classes and in special teaching units. They are taught either by the class teacher or by an additional language trainer.²⁴⁰ In secondary schools students can choose to attend language courses at four different levels, depending on how much English they already know. This enables students both to acquire a basic knowledge of English and to improve their fluency. Since the courses are integrated in the regular curriculum, students who attend them can gain credits as they would for regular classes.²⁴¹

Immigrant children between the ages of 11 and 18 who not only have a poor knowledge of English but who have also been unable to obtain much schooling in their country of origin can attend a Literacy Enrichment Academic Program. This program is offered at a total of 40 elementary and 13 secondary schools administered by the Toronto District School Board. It is designed primarily for refugee children and as well as teaching language skills it also includes instruction in reading and mathematics.²⁴²

The Toronto District School Board also supports the multi-linguality of its students by encouraging parents to continue speaking their mother tongue to their children at home. The Board bases this policy on studies showing that students who have a good foundation in their mother tongue perform better at school.²⁴³ As part of the International Languages – Elementary/African Heritage Programs immigrant children are also able to attend teaching units in their mother tongue. Thus, from kindergarten to eighth grade they receive two and a half hours of instruction in their first language every week in addition to regular classes. This option is also open to Canadian children who would like to learn a foreign language.²⁴⁴

Another goal of the School Board is to keep parents informed about how their children are doing at school and to involve them in their school career.²⁴⁵ This is difficult, however, if the parents speak little English. To avoid them being excluded from educational issues the School Board allocates funding to schools so that letters to parents can be translated into their native language and interpreters can be present when parents come to talk to teachers.²⁴⁶ In addition, the Board provides important information in the languages most commonly spoken by parents. An extensive 2010 survey to gauge parents' satisfaction with the Toronto District School Board, for example, was conducted in 25 different languages. One result of the survey was that 82 percent of the parents evaluated as positive the fact that information about their children's educational opportunities was provided in their mother tongue.²⁴⁷

If schools involve parents in the education of their children, this has a positive effect on the children – they perform better at school and leave school later. Yet despite all efforts, parents who are recent immigrants sometimes find it difficult to establish contact with school and teachers. Parents from China, for instance, often named language barriers and

Settlement Workers in Schools Program

What is it?

Integration managers in elementary and secondary schools with a large number of immigrant students; contact persons for teachers, students and their parents; additional group, information and orientation events

Who offers it?

Citizenship and Immigration Canada

Why?

Settlement workers liaise between teachers and parents, provide information and orientation for immigrant families, help immigrants to find a place to live and employment opportunities and help to create an integrative environment in schools

unfamiliarity with the Canadian school system as reasons why their participation in school activities such as parent-teacher discussions, fund-raising activities or music and sport events was limited.²⁴⁸ Settlement workers therefore act as a kind of integration manager, liaising between parents and school staff. They are assigned to schools with a large share of immigrant students as part of the Settlement Workers in Schools Program funded by the national government in Ottawa. Immigrant parents not only receive

information about the school system from them, but are offered all kinds of help in settling into their new living environment, from finding a place to live to finding work to local facilities and programs in general including language courses.²⁴⁹ The latter are also offered by the School Board itself.²⁵⁰ Settlement workers not only act as a liaison between parents and teachers but also help the school administration and teaching staff to work effectively with immigrant children.²⁵¹

Parenting and Family Literacy Centres

What are they?

Programs offered free of charge at elementary schools in reading, music, story hour, learning through play; attended by children together with their parents, grandparents or carers; led by trained staff; cooperation with teachers at the school

Who offers them?

Toronto District School Board

Who attends them?

Families in the community with children under six

Why?

To support children as early as possible by involving their families in their education


Create a solid foundation early on

Some programs of the Toronto District School Board start to involve parents directly in their children's education before they even reach school age. The 75 Parenting and Family Literacy Centres, located mainly in densely populated, multicultural areas of the city, are part of this program. Parents and grandparents can attend these Centres together with their children or grandchildren up to the age of six for 20 hours a week.²⁵² The Centres are designed to allow children to develop their language skills through play, so

that by the time they start school they are no longer behind their peers. Parents support their children in acquiring language skills and at the same time learn how they themselves can best support their offspring. The Centres include a library with books in different languages, allowing parents to read to their children in their own language. In addition, they receive important information about vaccinations, nutrition and other support programs and get to meet other parents.²⁵³

Family centres are worthwhile

Children who have attended a Parenting and Family Literacy Centre before kindergarten are much less likely to do poorly in the Early Development Instrument, a test of whether children are ready to go to school. Even children who have only attended such a Centre irregularly do better than their peers in the neighbourhood in four out of five areas tested. Attending a Centre regularly lowers the risk in all areas of being classified among the weakest quarter.



Percentage of children who belong to the weakest quarter according to EDI values, 2008
(Data based on: Yau, M.²⁵⁴)


The effectiveness of Parenting and Family Literacy Centres is shown in kindergarten, when children are tested to see whether they are ready to go to school. In Toronto this testing is done with the Early Development Instrument (EDI), which measures children's language and cognitive skills, state of health, social and emotional maturity, general knowledge and ability to communicate. If children have at least sometimes attended the Parenting and Family Literacy Centres before they go to kindergarten, on average they attain low EDI scores less often than their peers in the neighbourhood who have not attended the Centres. Children who have attended the Centres regularly benefit even more. They are much less likely to be behind in reading and writing at school. Altogether children who attend the Centres even manage to overtake their peers from better neighbourhoods – a remarkable achievement.²⁵⁵ The evaluation does not, however, address the question of whether the Centres in local communities tend to attract better educated parents, which, if the case, might partly explain their positive effect.

What can Germany learn?

Canada's experience teaches us that although a selective immigration policy can have a positive effect on how immigrant children perform at school, the higher educational level of immigrants to Canada does not on its own explain the differences between Germany and Canada in the educational achievement of second-generation immigrants. For in Canada many immigrant children from less educated families also obtain high qualifications and thus achieve upward educational mobility. They are supported by various measures and programs designed to compensate for language deficits and social disadvantages in school or even pre-school. In Germany, by contrast, the process of catching up in the second generation is extremely slow. This is partly because the school system is less permeable. Yet, precisely because the share of immigrants with a low level of education is high in Germany, the upward educational mobility of the second generation is all the more urgent. Germany therefore needs to make a much greater effort to do this. Currently, four out of ten children of immigrants do not obtain a vocational qualification and only 12 percent complete tertiary education. Hence they lag far behind their native German peers and scarcely manage to obtain a higher level of education than their parents (see Chapter 3).

German only spoken at home in one household in two

Both in Canada and in Germany the share of adolescents who speak the local language at home rises from the first to the second generation of immigrants. Nevertheless, more than one adolescent in two whose parents are immigrants speaks the parents' mother tongue at home. In Canada this applies to only one in three.



Percentage of 15-year-olds who speak the local language at home, 2009
(Data based on: Klieme, E., Artelt, C., Hartig, J., Jude, N., Köller, O., Prenzel, M., Schneider, W. & Stanat, P.²⁵⁶)

In Germany, therefore, programs like those offered in Canada could give many children and adolescents a new perspective and strengthen their determination to achieve upward educational mobility. Particularly the children of immigrants would benefit from programs aimed at children and adolescents from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, for compared with native children they are much more likely to come from homes with a low level of parental education and a low income.²⁵⁷ But programs specially tailored to second-generation immigrants are required too. Because of insufficient language skills, they often have an additional hurdle to overcome in their school career. Currently, around half of all children of immigrants in Germany do not speak German at home. Unlike in Canada, this has a significant influence on their educational achievement. Particularly surveys of reading and writing skills show that children who do not speak German at home perform much worse at school.²⁵⁸

Overcome language deficits early on

To prevent poor language skills from permanently inhibiting the educational achievement of children with a migration background, targeted language support programs are required. Programs like Toronto's English as a Second Language program could be used to target children with deficits in the language of instruction for extra help in or outside school.


These programs should, however, begin well before children start school. Germany's multi-track education system leaves children with language deficits little time to catch up, so early intervention is important. The language development of children aged four to six is currently measured using the so-called language acquisition assessment procedure (*Sprachstandserhebungsverfahren*),²⁵⁹ but to date the language support programs introduced on the basis of these data have not managed to compensate for the learning deficits of children with special language

needs. Not least because a natural threshold in language acquisition occurs between the ages of three and four, language support programs ought to start much earlier. Daycare and pre-school education for the early years is therefore crucial here. Yet children with a migration background attend pre-school education much less often than others, thus missing an important opportunity to acquire language at an age when they are particularly receptive.²⁶⁰

There are various reasons why precisely those children who would benefit most from pre-school education are not being reached. Generally, families from weaker social backgrounds tend to send their children to daycare facilities less, and immigrants are more likely than native Germans to belong to this group.²⁶¹ In addition, immigrants seem to have more reservations about daycare centres, especially those that are run by the church.²⁶² Language barriers may also make it difficult for them to build relationships of trust with the staff. This is especially important for young children so that parents feel comfortable about entrusting their children to the care of professionals.²⁶³

Not all children attend pre-school education

In most German states almost all three- to five-year-olds without a migration background attend some kind of daycare outside the family – around 96 percent of them go to kindergarten. Children with a migration background are less likely to be cared for outside the family. The difference is particularly conspicuous for the under-threes.



Attendance rates of the under-threes and three- to five-year-olds with or without a migration background at daycare facilities or other publicly funded childcare, in percent, 2012
(Based on Statistisches Bundesamt data.²⁶⁴)

While programs like Parenting and Family Literacy Centres are not a substitute for daycare centres, they can be a good supplement. If, like in Toronto, they are located mainly in neighbourhoods with a large immigrant population, they appeal particularly to those parents who are less likely to send their children to daycare. The fact that parents attend these centres together with their children has a dual positive effect. First of all, their reservations (about daycare centres, for instance) may decrease if they are able to experience directly what is offered to their children. Second, the Centres involve parents more closely in language programs, showing them how best to support their children's language acquisition so that they can stimulate their language learning at home, too. In Germany, the so-called NRW Family Centres established in North-Rhine Westphalia are a promising initiative in this respect.

Bring parents into school

Parents have an important influence on their children's educational achievements, so schools should endeavour to involve them. If, however, the parents' knowledge of German is poor, this is often difficult. To prevent parental language deficits becoming an obstacle to their children doing well at school, parents who speak little German need to be addressed in their mother tongue. Possible ways of doing this would be to prepare translations of notices and letters sent home and to have interpreters available when parents meet with teachers. This should make many immigrant parents less apprehensive about going to their children's school.

With the increasing trend towards all-day schools, integration efforts should in any case focus more on schools. If they were to offer integration courses or additional language courses, they would automatically become an important point of contact for many parents. Like Canada's Settlement Workers in Schools Program, German schools could appoint integration managers to speak directly to immigrant parents. Not only would these managers provide an advisory service for students and parents, they could also do more to alert teachers and school directors to the special needs of students with a migration background.

Identify schools' different needs

The more account schools take of the individual learning needs of children and adolescents, the more financial and personnel resources they will require. This applies particularly to schools where many of the students come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. Schools need to find suitable instruments to survey the social structure of their students, for only in this way can the schools with particular needs be identified. The Learning Opportunities Index of the Toronto District School Board could provide a model. Spending more on schools in socially weak neighbourhoods would make them more attractive and thus break the downward spiral of low-achievers and poor-quality instruction. This would particularly benefit many children of immigrants.²⁶⁵

Some German states already use a social index to determine the allocation of financial resources to school districts. Alongside Hamburg and Bremen these include Germany's most populous state, North-Rhine Westphalia.²⁶⁶ Here 1,000 teaching posts for elementary schools and 620 posts for *Hauptschulen* (secondary schools for the least academic students) were allocated according to the social index for the school year 2009/2010. Alongside the percentage of immigrants (foreigners and *Aussiedler*, or repatriated Germans) and the percentage of people receiving social security benefits, this also takes account of the share of single-family occupancy. Since in North-Rhine Westphalia the social index is currently calculated only at the level of districts and independent cities, it is scarcely possible to pinpoint which specific schools require extra resources. It is therefore up to the local education authority to decide how posts should be allocated among the schools in a particular district.²⁶⁷ A more standardised and transparent procedure at school level would allow the allocation of posts to better meet the needs of individual schools.

6

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

Demographic change is reducing the supply of labour in Germany. Bringing more women and older people into employment may cushion the negative economic consequences of this trend, but will not be able to fully compensate for it. In future, more urgently needed skilled workers will have to come from abroad. Yet to date Germany still has little experience in recruiting qualified immigrants. The experience of countries that have been systematically increasing their workforce by recruiting qualified labour from abroad may therefore provide important ideas and impetuses for Germany.

Canada is the most prominent example of human capital-oriented immigration – in other words, pursuing a selective immigration policy that chooses immigrants on the basis of their abilities and skills regardless of whether they already have a job offer. In the long term Canada hopes that this policy will generate economic growth and new jobs.

Despite all its experience, Canadian immigration policy remains an experiment, which continually tests new ideas and arrangements with a view to improvement. In the present study the Berlin Institute has tried to draw some important lessons from this process for Germany's immigration and integration policy.

A Shape and market Germany as a country of immigration

Labour from abroad may in future help us to increase our prosperity and to stabilise our social security systems. To do this Germany requires capable people prepared to move here permanently. This fact needs to be communicated more effectively to the German population than it has been to date. At the same time, Germany needs to present itself to the outside world as an attractive country to migrate to.

1 Commit to immigration

Politicians from all parties should in future make a stronger commitment to a long-term, pro-active immigration policy, spelling out that countries like Canada or Australia have already been benefiting from immigration for many decades and that in Germany, too, immigration can create additional jobs. Only in this way will it be possible to win a broad social consensus for more labour immigration and create a welcoming culture.

2 Make immigration from non-EU countries socially acceptable

EU states can only serve as sources of immigration to a limited extent. They do not offer a permanent solution, because most of them are likely to face similar demographic problems to Germany in the foreseeable future. Their populations are aging too and they will shrink in the future. What is more, many immigrants from other EU countries return to their home countries after a short time. For this reason, any long-term recruitment strategy ought to explicitly target people from non-EU states.

3 Actively promote Germany

In the competition for mobile skilled workers, traditional immigration countries like Canada, the United States or Australia are at an advantage on account of their long history of immigration and the fact that they are English-speaking. All the more important it is for Germany in the future to present itself as an attractive country to migrate to. This could be done via careers fairs in other countries, integrated Internet portals or information events staged by German institutions abroad, such as chambers of commerce, German schools or Goethe Institutes.

4 Create attractive conditions

To successfully sell itself as an employment location, Germany needs to create attractive conditions for immigrants. This would include allowing immigrants to bring members of their immediate family with them. In addition, temporary resident status should be associated with the chance of obtaining permission to stay permanently. For immigrants to want to settle in Germany in the long term, they require not only a job but also the prospect of becoming part of society. Becoming a German citizen early on is an important precondition for this. The current citizenship requirement of a minimum of six years residence should therefore be reduced to around four years.

B

Create instruments to manage immigration

The most important component of a managed immigration policy is the regulatory framework for entering the country. It influences directly which and how many immigrants come to Germany. Canada's experience teaches us that a single instrument is not sufficient for this. Rather, immigrants from different occupations and with different qualifications need to be offered different incentive systems to come to Germany.

5 Introduce an intelligent points system

Germany should introduce a points system that enables highly skilled workers to be recruited effectively. Such a system would also send a signal of openness to the outside world and help to promote the country. Suitable selection criteria might include level of education, language skills, age and working experience in Germany. Extra points for particular occupational groups should not be a primary criterion in a human capital-oriented system, and a good knowledge of English should be able to compensate for little knowledge of German, for particularly in highly qualified sectors English is often used as an alternative working language. Immigrants selected via a points system should receive a permanent residence permit as should their spouse and children.

6 Remain flexible

A points system can only manage immigration sensibly if it is flexible. Necessary adjustments to the way points are allocated should be made via annual statutory instruments issued by the federal government. To avoid having the fine-tuning of the system fall victim to the interests of political parties, a council of experts consisting of representatives from economic research institutes, employers and employees should be established to recommend adjustments on an annual basis. In addition, it would make sense initially to keep annual immigration low via a quota and subsequently to increase it slowly. This would enable the downstream infrastructure to be gradually adjusted to include integration measures, and would also allow Germany to gather experience while containing the risk.

7 Liberalise labour market-oriented immigration

In order to close short-term gaps in the labour market and to bring skilled workers with mid-level qualifications into the country, Germany should liberalise its policy of labour market-oriented immigration. Whereas currently only skilled workers from particular occupational groups are allowed to enter the country, in the future any foreigner with a job offer who has passed the labour market test should be granted a work permit, initially for a limited period. Once the immigrant has lived and worked in Germany for a certain amount of time, he or she should have the opportunity to receive permanent residence. To avoid excessively depressing wages, the labour market test should ascertain whether the immigrant is being employed under the same conditions as a native German would be. A priority check to make sure that no other skilled person with equal qualifications is available in Germany or the EU should follow as simple a procedure as possible.

8

Install a central job data bank

A central job data bank would be a good way of establishing contact between employers in Germany and employees from abroad. Employers could use it to advertise open posts and draw them to the attention of workers from other countries. Potential immigrants could use the data bank to post their CV and their qualifications. This would enable small and medium-sized companies in rural areas in particular, which seldom have access to an international labour recruitment network, to meet their requirements for skilled labour.

9 Recruit international students

Germany should make a greater effort to recruit young people from all over the world to study here and to encourage them to stay in the country after they have graduated. International graduates from German universities are proven to have the greatest success in integrating. Educational institutions should therefore offer more degree programs in English, which would also benefit German students.

C Create good starting conditions

Even highly qualified immigrants often find it very difficult to start new lives in Germany without initial help. Therefore state and non-state actors need to provide and effectively advertise various services to help immigrants find a job commensurate with their qualifications as quickly as possible.

10 Differentiate between newcomers and second-generation immigrants

Helping newly arrived workers to get started in Germany poses challenges for policy-makers which are different to the task of “catching up” with integrating people with a migration background who have been living in Germany for many years. The general term “integration” obscures the difference between new arrivals and “old immigrants” in the public perception. In order to meet the needs of both groups, there needs to be a clearer differentiation between what is required in each case.

11 Begin integration in the country of origin

Integration measures should already start before potential immigrants have left their country of origin. Orientation courses like the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program (see p. 49) could help to prepare immigrants well so that they arrive in Germany with realistic expectations. More language courses should also be offered in the immigrants’ country of origin. In this respect local German institutions like the Goethe Institute could expand the courses they offer.

12 Improve recognition of foreign credentials

Despite a law governing recognition, there still remains much to be done when it comes to recognising foreign qualifications. Professions regulated by the federal states and non-regulated professions are not covered by this law, but nonetheless require some kind of arrangement that would make it easier for immigrants to start work in Germany. Qualifications should be recognised mainly before the immigrant enters Germany.

13 Expand programs for adapting qualifications

In cases when foreigners are not granted unconditional permission to practice their profession, programs that will allow them to adapt their qualifications to German requirements must be expanded as immigration increases. Programs modelled on the Canadian bridging programs (see p. 50) would ideally combine theoretical instruction with practice, for example in the form of professional internships. In addition, particularly if a points system is used, there would be a need for language courses tailored to particular professions aimed mainly at advanced level students. Integration courses should be supplemented accordingly.

14 Establish mentor programs

Social contacts and personal relationships make for a smooth start in a foreign job market. To help immigrants to make contacts quickly, mentor programs enabling new arrivals to meet native Germans would be desirable. Particularly contacts with people in the field in which the immigrant intends to work, such as the TRIEC Mentoring Partnership (see p. 51) would do much to promote the integration of immigrants.

15 Involve employers

Employers are probably the people with the greatest interest in recruiting skilled workers from abroad. Small and medium-sized companies in particular are already suffering shortages of qualified personnel. They should therefore be more closely involved in the integration process than they have been to date, for example via Immigrant Employment Councils (see p. 52) in line with the Canadian model. In addition, companies should become more aware that they bear a certain responsibility for creating favourable conditions for employing immigrants – for example, by initially allowing immigrants time to attend further education and language courses. In addition, certain employees should be appointed as “integration officers” – people to whom new arrivals can turn for help.

16 Improve coordination of actors

In order to coordinate the various integration programs meaningfully, the various institutions offering them need to be better networked to avoid duplication and also stem the frequently criticised proliferation of offers. In addition, even with programs designed to build on one another, immigrants may need to be guided from one to the next.

D Make the education system more permeable – provide needs-based assistance to immigrant children

A human capital-oriented immigration policy would also have a positive impact on the educational level of immigrant children. But even in future, highly qualified workers will not be the only immigrants – Germany will also receive people with medium and low qualifications. The children of the latter will have a double burden to bear, for they will also encounter an education system that is not very permeable and that tracks children early in their school career, leaving them little time to catch up with their often poorer language skills. German policy-makers must therefore address these children's difficulties with needs-oriented programs and ensure that the children of immigrants and native Germans are given equal opportunities for upward educational mobility.

17 Turn schools into integration centres

As the number of all-day schools increases, children will spend even more time at school, making it all the more important for the school principal and staff to address the individual needs of students and to give them the opportunity to make the best possible use of their abilities – for instance via Individual Education Plans (see p. 60) which also involve their parents.

To enable immigrant parents to actively follow their children's progress at school, they should if necessary be addressed in their mother tongue. Installing integration managers modelled on the Canadian Settlement Workers in Schools Program (see

p. 61) in schools with a high proportion of children with a migration background would also make parents less inhibited about coming to school. Integration and language courses could also be offered at school in the future. Schools would thus also become an important point of contact for parents as well, making them more likely to meet their children's teachers.

18 Identify schools with a need for additional funding resources

To target restricted public resources where they are most needed, schools with a special need for additional funding should be identified. A procedure similar to the Canadian Learning Opportunities Index (see p. 60) could help to do this. Such an index should also include various socio-economic factors of the neighbourhood in which the students live – such as average income, share of low-earners and people receiving social assistance payments and the share of one-parent families.

19 Offer language instruction to pre-schoolers

For many children of immigrants the German language is the biggest obstacle to performing well at school. The state therefore needs to provide special language courses for pre-schoolers, so that these children will have caught up by the time they finish elementary school when the choice of secondary school determines a child's future.

20 Offer educational opportunities for parents and pre-schoolers

Pre-school facilities such as kindergartens and daycare centres are a good place to encourage early language acquisition. But socially weak and immigrant families tend to use these facilities less than others. In order to reach them nonetheless, additional centres should be established in disadvantaged neighbourhoods that parents can visit together with their children. Modelled on the Canadian Parenting and Family Literacy Centres (see p. 62) these could help children improve their language skills through play while their parents learn how best to help their children acquire language.

E Gather more data

Canada's experience has shown how important and helpful it is to obtain as differentiated a picture of the integration landscape as possible. Only when one knows how well or badly a particular group of immigrants or children from a particular social background in a particular neighbourhood are doing does it become possible to take concrete steps to help. Successful integration policies can only be analysed and expanded through a precise observation of the situation of immigrants. Using surveys like the micro-census, Germany should gather as much anonymous data about as many socio-economic indicators on immigrants as possible, in addition to recording their participation in integration programs. Moreover, it would be desirable to find out about the reasons why immigrants have come to Germany (for example to work, to seek asylum or to join their families). In the educational sector a survey modelled on the Canadian Student and Parent Census (see p. 60) could be used to pinpoint the difficulties of particular groups of students and help to resolve them.

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+++ more economic immigrants in Canada +++ growing shortage of labour in Germany +++ higher future demand for highly qualified workers +++ only
support for pupils in Canada +++ more immigration strengthens social security systems +++ points-based system brings highly qualified people into the